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Over the last decade, the advent of social media has profoundly changed the way people produce
and consume information online. On these platforms, users themselves play a role in selecting the
sources from which they consume information, overthrowing traditional journalistic gatekeeping.
Moreover, advertisers can target users with news stories using users’ personal data. This new model
has many advantages: the propagation of news is faster, the number of news sources is large, and the
topics covered are diverse. However, in this new model, users are often overloaded with redundant
information, and they can get trapped in filter bubbles by consuming divisive and potentially false
information. To tackle these concerns, in my thesis, I address the following important questions:
(i) How efficient are users at selecting their information sources? We have defined three intuitive
notions of users’ efficiency in social media: link, in-flow, and delay efficiency. We use these three
measures to assess how good users are at selecting who to follow within the social media system in
order to most efficiently acquire information.
(ii) How can we break the filter bubbles that users get trapped in? Users on social media sites such
as Twitter often get trapped in filter bubbles by being exposed to radical, highly partisan, or divisive
information. To prevent users from getting trapped in filter bubbles, we propose an approach to inject
diversity in users’ information consumption by identifying non-divisive, yet informative information.
(iii) How can we design an efficient framework for fact-checking? Proliferation of false information
is a major problem in social media. To counter it, social media platforms typically rely on expert
fact-checkers to detect false news. However, human fact-checkers can realistically only cover a tiny
fraction of all stories. So, it is important to automatically prioritizing and selecting a small number of
stories for human to fact check. However, the goals for prioritizing stories for fact-checking are unclear.
We identify three desired objectives to prioritize news for fact-checking. These objectives are based




In den letzten zehn Jahren haben soziale Medien die Art und Weise, wie Menschen online Infor-
mationen generieren und konsumieren, grundlegend verändert. Auf Social Media Plattformen wählen
Nutzer selbst aus, von welchen Quellen sie Informationen beziehen hebeln damit das traditionelle
Modell journalistischen Gatekeepings aus. Zusätzlich können Werbetreibende Nutzerdaten dazu ver-
wenden, um Nachrichtenartikel gezielt an Nutzer zu verbreiten. Dieses neue Modell bietet einige
Vorteile: Nachrichten verbreiten sich schneller, die Zahl der Nachrichtenquellen ist größer, und es steht
ein breites Spektrum an Themen zur Verfügung. Das hat allerdings zur Folge, dass Benutzer häufig
mit überflüssigen Informationen überladen werden und in Filterblasen geraten können, wenn sie zu
einseitige oder falsche Informationen konsumieren. Um diesen Problemen Rechnung zu tragen, gehe
ich in meiner Dissertation auf die drei folgenden wichtigen Fragestellungen ein:
• (i) Wie effizient sind Nutzer bei der Auswahl ihrer Informationsquellen? Dazu definieren
wir drei verschiedene, intuitive Arten von Nutzereffizienz in sozialen Medien: Link-, In-Flow-
und Delay-Effizienz. Mithilfe dieser drei Metriken untersuchen wir, wie gut Nutzer darin sind
auszuwählen, wem sie auf Social Media Plattformen folgen sollen um effizient an Informationen
zu gelangen.
• (ii) Wie können wir verhindern, dass Benutzer in Filterblasen geraten? Nutzer von Social
Media Webseiten werden häufig Teil von Filterblasen, wenn sie radikalen, stark parteiischen oder
spalterischen Informationen ausgesetzt sind. Um das zu verhindern, entwerfen wir einen Ansatz
mit dem Ziel, den Informationskonsum von Nutzern zu diversifizieren, indem wir Informationen
identifizieren, die nicht polarisierend und gleichzeitig informativ sind.
• (iii) Wie können wir Nachrichten effizient auf faktische Korrektheit hin überprüfen? Die
Verbreitung von Falschinformationen ist eines der großen Probleme sozialer Medien. Um dem
entgegenzuwirken, sind Social Media Plattformen in der Regel auf fachkundige Faktenprüfer
v
zur Identifizierung falscher Nachrichten angewiesen. Die manuelle Überprüfung von Fakten
kann jedoch realistischerweise nur einen sehr kleinen Teil aller Artikel und Posts abdecken.
Daher ist es wichtig, automatisch eine überschaubare Zahl von Artikeln für die manuellen
Faktenkontrolle zu priorisieren. Nach welchen Zielen eine solche Priorisierung erfolgen soll, ist
jedoch unklar. Aus diesem Grund identifizieren wir drei wünschenswerte Priorisierungskriterien
für die Faktenkontrolle. Diese Kriterien beruhen auf der Wahrnehmung des Wahrheitsgehalts von
Artikeln durch Nutzer. Unsere Schlüsselbeobachtung ist, dass diese drei Kriterien in der Praxis
nicht miteinander vereinbar sind.
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Traditionally, information and news were produced by professional journalists belonging to mass media
organizations. These media organizations disseminate news to broad audiences using traditional forms
of media broadcasts such as newspapers, magazines, radio, and television. However, with the advent
of social media and further changes in the media environment and media markets, traditional media
organizations have been facing a variety of challenges that threaten their survival [Murschetz and
Friedrichsen, 2017, Picard, 2010, Barthelemy et al., 2011, Journalism and Media, 2014]. For instance,
over the last 10 years, they have suffered a substantial decrease in daily circulation, and as a result
they have lost advertising revenue proportional to their audience [Der, 2013]. Journalism and Media
[2018] have observed that U.S. daily newspaper circulation is decreasing every year. The total estimated
circulation of U.S. daily newspapers in 1980 was 62,645,000; by 2010, this fell to 48,000,000, and
furthermore, by 2018, it dropped to 28,500,000. In a different survey [Journalism and Media, 2020,
2017], it has been shown that in 2017, 17% of U.S. adults (age 30 to 50) got their political news from
print newspapers, while as of early 2020, this number has dropped to only 3% [Journalism and Media,
2020, 2017].
People used to use traditional media to recieve their news mostly from newspapers. Nowadays,
this is changing, and people are getting news less from newspapers and more from websites/apps and
television [Journalism and Media, 2020]. In addition, there has been an ongoing trend in whic people
especially young people are getting more of their news from social media. Social media sites like
Twitter and Facebook have increasingly become popular digital news and information marketplaces
[Kim et al., 2017, Ribeiro et al., 2019]. A new survey by the Pew Research Center conducted between
October 2019 and June 2020 finds that almost half (48%) of young U.S. people age 18 to 29, and 40%
of adults age 30 to 55 rely primarily on social media for political news, whereas only 25% of young
people and 32% of adults use news websites/apps and television. [Journalism and Media, 2020].
The rapid adoption of social media sites has brought profound changes to the ways information is
produced and consumed in our society. This paradigm shift in how content is shared —from mass media
to online social media— offers new opportunities but also raises many new challenges and concerns. To
better understand these issues, we now focus on discussing the differences between traditional media
and social media.
• Traditional media is a one-way conversation, whereas social media is two-way . The typical flow
of traditional media looks as follows: the professional publishers pitch the story, the reporter
publishes the story and people are exposed to the story. Thus, the content and timing of infor-
mation are completely out of the consumers’ control [Gomez-Rodriguez et al., 2014]. However,
with social media sites, users actively produce and consume a wide variety of information and
ideas and can control the content and timing of the information they get by selecting their sources
efficiently.
• Traditional forms of media generally offer a wider audience pool, while social media allows
for more targeted distribution. Social media gives producers the opportunity to carefully target
their audience, selecting everything from the demographics and geography of the audience to the
time of day the post will go live [Sears and L. FREEDMAN, 1967, Stroud, 2011, Jomini, 2010,
Flaxman et al., 2016].
• There are significant differences in ways we can use to assess the biases and accuracy of
information produced by traditional mass media and social media. With traditional media, there
were only a handful of news producers, making it easy for media watchdog groups to check
the accuracy or biases in the presented news. However, the shift of news consumption to social
media has allowed news and information to be produced and shared by members of social
media themselves. The problem is, there is no accountability for the accuracy of the presented
information. The consequence of this has been the proliferation of fake news, conspiracy theories,
and hateful content [Shu et al., 2017, Chopra et al., 2017, Zhao et al., 2015].
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While there are other changes due to information consumption moving from mass media to social
media, such as, how retrieval (search and recommendation) algorithms influence users’ information
consumption [Bakshy et al., 2015, Flaxman et al., 2016], our main motivation is to understand and
counteract the new challenges that arise due to these three main differences described above.
1.1 Challenges
Here we briefly enumerate three essential challenges that we address in this thesis.
Efficiency: Users on social media sites actively produce and consume a wide variety of information and
ideas. On these sites, users typically choose their information sources, which in turn determine what
specific information they receive, how much information they receive, and how quickly this information
is shown to them. Since users can only select their information sources and don’t have control over
the context they are exposed to, a natural question that arises is how efficient social media users are at
selecting their information sources. In this thesis, we propose a computational framework to quantify
users’ efficiency in selecting information sources in terms of the number of sources the user follows, the
amount of (redundant) information she acquires, and the delay with which she receives the information.
Non-divisiveness: Many news stories are divisive, often posted by polarized publishers, eliciting
different reactions from users with different political leanings or pre-existing views, e.g., conservatives
or liberals. While various news sources publish divisive and non-divisive news that cover a given
story, users often limit themselves to the divisive stories that reinforce their prior views [Sears and
L. FREEDMAN, 1967, Stroud, 2011, Jomini, 2010, Flaxman et al., 2016, Himelboim et al., 2013, Babaei
et al., 2018, Chiang and Knight, 2011]. This selective exposure and consumption of divisive information
may lead to a more politically fragmented, less cohesive society [Cha et al., 2010] and the formation
of filter bubbles or echo chambers [Bakshy et al., 2015, Bozdag, 2013, Flaxman et al., 2016, Pariser,
2011]. In this thesis, we propose a complementary approach by identifying and highlighting news posts
that are likely to evoke similar reactions from the readers, irrespective of their political leanings. We
hope that this approach could lead to less segregation in information consumption [Chakraborty et al.,
2017].
Trust: Due to the massive amount of news produced every day on social media, there is no account-
ability for the presented data’s accuracy, leading to the proliferation of fake news. Fighting falsehoods
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online is one of the great challenges today, particularly during a pandemic. Most social media platforms
typically rely on expert fact-checkers to fight this proliferation of false news [Friggeri et al., 2014,
Kwon et al., 2017, Ma et al., 2016]. However, human fact-checkers can realistically only cover a
subset of stories being circulated, raising the question of how social media platforms should prioritize
stories for fact-checking. Here, we present a framework for prioritizing stories, with three important
objectives: (1) removing false news stories from circulation, (2) correcting the misperception of users,
and (3) decreasing disagreement among different users’ perceptions. We argue that current mechanisms
are insufficient and only partially satisfy these objectives. We further propose new mechanisms to
operationalize the objectives by gathering user perceptions using a novel truth perception test.
In summary, we focus on three important questions: i) How efficient are users at selecting their
information sources?, (ii) How does the consumed information impact users and society? , and (iii)
How do users perceive the truthfulness of information?
In the rest of the chapter, we briefly review the related work and then give a high-level overview of
the specific contributions of this thesis.
1.2 State-of-the-art and related work
In this thesis, we study users’ efficiencies in their information source selections. Then we focus on how
the consumed information impacts users and society. Accordingly, we demonstrate how non-divisive
news (high consensus) may lead to a less politically fragmented and more cohesive society. Finally, we
design an efficient framework for fact-checking that helps people assess the credibility of information
on social media.
We have three parts in this thesis as described above. The first part i.e., efficiency, is something
that people have never looked at before. People have analyzed how information is produced and
consumed [Cha et al., 2012, Kwak et al., 2010, Wu et al., 2011] as well as the amount of information
being exchanged between different groups of users, but this is not really related to the question of how
efficient users are at selecting their information sources. Therefore, in this section we focus on the last
two parts. We briefly outline current knowledge about the biases in the information consumed by social
media users. We finish with a brief overview of prior work in the area of fake news detection.
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1.2.1 Biases in social media news
News media organizations have a major impact on political issues and, conclusively, on our society
[Groseclose and Milyo, 2005, Chiang and Knight, 2011]. Therefore, several contemporary works
have focused on understanding how and to what extent news media outlets can impact people and
society, such as in the cases of the White Helmets in Syria [Starbird et al., 2018] and the 2016 US
presidential campaign [Rizoiu et al., 2018, Ribeiro et al., 2019]. We are interested in the divisiveness of
news content as it relates to concepts of bias that prior work has explored in the context of traditional
news organizations [Ahlers, 2006, Althaus and Tewksbury, 2000, Dutta-Bergman, 2004, Gentzkow,
2007, Kaye and Johnson, 2003, Newell et al., 2008]. The approach that has been typically taken is
to assess a bias of each publisher (e.g., the publishers are categorized as left-leaning or right-leaning)
either by analyzing the audience (audience-based method), or the content (content-based method). The
audience-based strategy involves analyzing a news outlet’s readership, which assumes that a news
outlet’s content and attitudes drive its audience’s biases. For example, Groseclose and Milyo [2005]
assigned a political bias score to news media outlets by investigating the relationship between the news
media and members of the US Congress regarding their co-citation of think tanks. The content-based
strategy is based on the news, content for example important events covered by news media sources
[Covert and Wasburn, 2007, Budak et al., 2016]. Budak et al. [2016] combined machine-learning and
crowdsourcing techniques to study the selection and framing of political issues by news organizations.
Now by moving to social media, people have tried to extend these approaches to social media.
Ribeiro et al. [2015] and think-tanks [Bakshy et al., 2015, Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010, Zhou et al.,
2011, Mitchell et al., 2014] use audience-based method to assess social media outlets. As there are
significantly more news publishers and audiences on social media than in the traditional media, the
audience-based strategies can only cover a limited number of news publishers, whereas content-based
strategies are more suitable to extend to social media [Munson et al., Ribeiro et al., 2015, Bakshy et al.,
2015, Zhou et al., 2011, Mitchell et al., 2014]. Recently, the dissemination of news on social networks
has been investigated by several studies [Bhattacharya and Ram, 2012] in terms of publishers’ biases
[Chakraborty et al., 2016a] and the characteristics of spreaders [Hu et al., 2012]. However, what we are
really interested in is not really the biases of publishers as a whole, but the biases of any individual
article to see to what extent the article is divisive.
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1.2.2 Strategies for detection and mitigation of fake news
Algorithms have become ubiquitous in curating and presenting information to users on online platforms.
In recent years, a growing amount of effort has been put into detecting false information by analyzing
large-scale digitally logged user behavioral and social network data on the web. False news can be
divided into two different types, misinformation and disinformation.
The first kind is misinformation (i.e., a piece of information that happens to be wrong). Here,
researchers have long investigated online rumors, a term used to describe claims that have yet to
be verified as ‘true’ [Qazvinian et al., 2011, Kwon et al., 2013a]. Based on theoretical studies on
characterizing online rumor behaviors [Oh et al., 2013, Maddock et al., 2015], computer science
researchers have developed rumor detection algorithms based on features describing both linguistic
characteristics as well as diffusion patterns of rumors [Kwon et al., 2013b, Zhao et al., 2015]. Recently,
a study [Kwon et al., 2017] compared classification capabilities across such multiple feature categories
and built an algorithm that achieves high accuracy at identifying rumors in the early stages of rumor
spreading. Another line of studies proposed deep learning approaches to detect rumors without a
labor-intensive feature engineering. Ma et al. [2016] proposed an RNN-based algorithm to learn
sequential information on online rumor spreading. From experiments on Twitter and Weibo, their
approach outperformed existing feature-based algorithms and further tackled early detection problems.
Other newly proposed deep learning models combine temporal activity patterns of spreaders and
source characteristics with existing features. In particular, a model called CSI [Ruchansky et al., 2017]
demonstrated state-of-the-art performance in detecting rumors on social media platforms.
The second information type is disinformation (i.e., a piece of information that is intentionally
manipulated or wrong). This refers to “fake news” which is intentionally and verifiably false [Shu
et al., 2017]. Detecting news articles that contain false claims is a challenging task because human
evaluators have shown only marginal improvements (66%) over random guesses (50%) in a crowd
sourced study [Kumar et al., 2016]. Such findings justify the need for an automated fact-checking
system. As a preliminary step, recent studies have focused on the fake news problem known as clickbait
articles or stance detection, in which the news headline and the associated body text have a discordant
relationship [Chen et al., 2015]. One study [Chakraborty et al., 2016b] developed a SVM model
that predicts clickbait articles based on linguistic patterns. Using the same dataset, another group
6
suggested a neural network approach that measures textual similarities between the headline and first
paragraph [Rony et al., 2017].
The above studies discuss various methods to identify false news stories on the Web. Once detected,
false stories are clearly labeled, either by reputable sources or by a large number of individuals, but no
study has examined how false or true news stories may be differently perceived by people irrespective
of their ground truth. Furthermore, these stories do not consider the case when a true story is perceived
falsely by the audience and misses the chance to propagate properly. In this work, we take a step back
and ask whether and how the veracity of news stories relates to their perceived quality by the public
and measure to what extent false stories get perceived as true and vice versa.
1.3 Thesis research: Analyzing information consumption on social me-
dia along the dimentions of efficiency, divisiveness, and trust
Broadly speaking, our contributions in this thesis can be divided into three parts. (i) We propose a
computational framework to quantify users’ efficiency in selecting information sources. Our framework
is based on the assumption that the goal of users is to acquire a set of unique pieces of information. We
define three different notions of efficiency —link, in-flow, and delay— corresponding to the number
of sources the user follows, the amount of (redundant) information she acquires and the delay with
which she receives the information. (ii) We present an approach that identifies non-divisiveness (high
consensus) posts that generate similar reactions from different readers regardless of their political
leanings. We then try to see how we can break the filter bubble (exposing people to eaually to diverse
news) that people get trapped in. (iii) We focus on examining how users perceive the truthfulness of
the information they consume from their information sources. Finally based on users’ perceptions, we
introduce three orthogonal ranking objectives for fact-checking.
1.3.1 Our contributions
In this thesis, we analyze social media users’ information consumption along the dimensions of
efficiency [Babaei et al., 2015, 2016], divisiveness [Babaei et al., 2018], and trust [Babaei et al., 2019],
which we briefly describe next as in the following.
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Our research methodology follows a data-driven approach, with the ultimate goal of contributing
to more informed system designs. We frequently conduct large-scale measurement studies to collect
real data about information that users produce or consume on social media. In particular, to develop
a computational method to measure users’ efficiency at selecting information sources , we leverage
tools and techniques from graph theory, combinatorial optimization, convex optimization, and machine
learning. We further leverage data mining schemes to elicit knowledge about users’ perception and
judgments of various political content.
The insights obtained from the measurement and analysis studies will ultimately help in the
design of more effective system. Lastly, we build and publicly deploy our proposed methodologies to
provide usable and practical tools for users of existing social computing platforms (twitter-app.mpi-
sws.org/purple-feed). In the rest of the document, we briefly describe each of the projects I have done
in my PhD thesis.
1.3.2 Measuring the efficiency of users for selecting information sources [Babaei et al.,
2015, 2016]
The task of selecting information sources from potentially tens to hundreds of millions of users poses
serious challenges and raises important questions. For example, recent studies have observed that due
tothe fear of missing out on important information, users tend to follow too many other users [Hodas
and Lerman, 2012]. In the process, they receive a lot of redundant information [Babaei et al., 2015],
become overloaded, and effectively miss the information they are interested in [Gomez-Rodriguez et al.,
2014, Lerman and Hogg, 2014].
These observations raise questions about how efficient users are at choosing their information
sources. In our work, [Babaei et al., 2015, 2016], we identified three notions of efficiency for a user: (i)
link (i.e., number of sources the user follows), (ii) in-flow (i.e., the amount of (redundant) information
she acquires), and (iii) delay (i.e., the delay with which she receives the information). We introduced a
computational framework to quantify a user’s efficiency, which estimated the optimal set of users from
whom the user could have acquired the same pieces of information more efficiently, and compared this
optimal set with the user’s set of followees.
We observed that Twitter users exhibit sub-optimal efficiency across our three notions of efficiency.
Moreover, we showed that this lack of efficiency is a consequence of the triadic closure mechanism by
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which users typically discover and follow other users on social media platforms. Finally, we developed
a heuristic algorithm that enables users to be significantly more efficient at acquiring the same unique
pieces of information.
1.3.3 Breaking filter bubbles and echo chambers [Babaei et al., 2018, 2021]
Having characterized how efficient users are at selecting information sources, we next focus on
the impact of the consumed information on users and society. Within our society, there are many
divisive topics (posted by polarized publishers) for which different subgroups hold opposing ideological
positions (e.g., Republicans and Democrats in the U.S.). Here we first investigate how we can identify
non-divisive news. Finally, we propose and quantify the benefits of a potential strategy to spread
non-divisive news across readers with diverse political leanings.
Identifying non-divisive content from controversial topics [Babaei et al., 2018]
Social media platforms provide a wide variety of news sources covering the entire spectrum
of political ideology (e.g., Republicans and Democrats in the U.S.). Yet, many users mostly limit
themselves to news stories posted by polarized news sources, which reinforces their pre-existing
views. This selective exposure and consumption of divisive information may lead to a more politically
fragmented, less cohesive society [Liu and Weber, 2014]. To minimize the possibility of social
media users getting trapped in ‘echo chambers’ or ‘filter bubbles’, researchers have proposed more
diversity to the news that users are consuming [Park et al., 2009a, Munson et al., 2013b, Keegan,
2017]. Such approaches, which highlight the most belief-challenging news, often results in users
rejecting them, thereby defeating their purpose [Bail, 2014, Lord et al., 1979, Nyhan and Reifler,
2010, Taber and Lodge, 2006, Wood and Porter, 2019, Bail et al., 2018]. Here, we claim that while
all publishers, including polarized (biased, partisan) publishers, may post many divisive news stories
related to a specific divisive topic, they also post many non-divisive news stories related to that topic.
By non-divisive news stories, we mean stories that evoke similar reactions from different readers,
irrespective of their own political leanings. We propose a complementary approach to inject diversity in
users’ news consumption by highlighting and identifying non-divisive news posts on divisive topics
posted by polarized (divisive) publishers. Exposing users to non-divisive news may result in decreasing
disagreement amongst them about the divisive topics.
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Using our proposed consensus inference method, we publicly deployed "Purple Feed" – a system
which highlights non-divisive (high consensus) posts from different news outlets on Twitter. With "Pur-
ple Feed", the users can view the non-divisive (high consensus) tweets posted by both Republican- and
Democrat-leaning media outlets over the past week (deployed at http://twitter-app.mpi-sws.org/purple-
feed/).
Promoting high consensus news selectively to reach a diverse audience [Babaei et al., 2021]
As we discussed in the previous section, even though online social media (OSN) helps expose people to
diverse information and news, users may narrow their attention to posts that reinforce their pre-existing
views, which could lead to a more fragmented society. Aiming to combat this, as duscussed earlier, we
divided news on a given story into non-divisive (high consensus) and divisive (low consensus) posts
based on how similar the reactions were across users with diverse political views. We compiled a
Twitter dataset and make the following three key observations: (1) divisive (low consensus) news is
more likely to remain within subgroups of users with similar political leanings, whereas high consensus
news tends to spread across subgroups; (2) non-divisive (high consensus) news posted by neutral
publishers spreads more equally across subgroups; and (3) users that get the information from other
users instead of publishers, get even more biased exposure to news. Given the above observations we
propose methods to propagate high consensus stories broadly across society, aiming to break filter
bubbles (and thus potentially decreas polarization in society).
1.3.4 Utilizing users’ truth perceptions to prioritize the news stories for fact-checking
[Babaei et al., 2019]
Finally, in the last part of the thesis, we focus on addressing the important problem of detecting and
mitigating the dissemination of false information. Recently, social media sites have been severely
criticized for allowing fake news stories to spread unchecked on their platforms [Friggeri et al., 2014,
Kwon et al., 2017, Ma et al., 2016]. To counter the proliferation of fake news, social media sites are
relying on their users’ perceptions of the truthfulness of news stories to select stories to fact check.
However, to date, few studies have focused on understanding how users perceive truth in news stories
or how biases in their perceptions might affect current strategies to detect and label fake news stories.
Moreover, the goal of fact checking is also not clear. In the last part of the thesis, we describe three
important goals for fact-checking news stories based on users’ perceptions of the truthfulness of stories:
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Goal 1: Removing false news stories from circulation: By using users’ truth perception values as a
proxy, stories that are flagged by more users as false would be selected for fact checking at a
higher probability than stories that were not flagged or were flagged less often.
Goal 2: Correcting the misperception of users: Based on the biases in users’ perceptions, stories in
which users’ perceived truth levels differ significantly from ground truth levels (which we define
as the Total Perception Bias) would be prioritized for fact-checking. Using our metric of Total
Perception Bias and combining it with user demographics, we designed an automated method for
identifying news stories with high and low perception bias achieving an accuracy of 82%.
Goal 3: Decreasing the disagreement among users’ perceptions of truth: For society to have fruitful
debates in the public sphere, it is essential for common ground to exist among the different,
possibly disagreeing sections of the society. Thus, it is desirable to decrease the disagreement
among users’ truth perceptions by prioritizing those stories for fact checking in which people
disagree the most about the truth value of the stories. To achieve this goal, we prioritize stories
with high values of disputability (i.e., high variance in users’ truth perceptions of the story).
Through the analysis of a large set of user perceptions (N=15,000), we quantify biases in such
perceptions and explore how partisan leanings can influence stories prioritized for fact-checking. We
propose a framework for social media platforms to prioritize stories for fact checking by leveraging
users’ truth perceptions to achieve the three complementary objectives mentioned above. Using a
combination of user perceptions elicited using our truth perception tests, users’ demographic features,
and supervised machine learning methods, we provide mechanisms for operationalization strategies that
utilize users’ truth perceptions to achieve the above objectives for prioritizing stories for fact-checking.
1.4 Organization of the thesis
As part of my thesis research I have mainly focused on analyzing social media users’ information
consumption along the three dimensions of efficiency [Babaei et al., 2015, 2016], divisiveness [Babaei
et al., 2018, 2021], and trust [Babaei et al., 2019]. During my Ph.D. I have also worked on other
projects such as: (i) analyzing the quantitative and qualitative characterization of the Russia-linked ad
campaigns on Facebook [Ribeiro et al., 2019], (ii) studying the evolution of audiences’ characteristics
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on social media over time [Grabowicz et al., 2016], and (iii) addressing the problem of influence
maximization while enhancing group fairness conditions [Ali et al., 2019b, Khajehnejad et al., 2020b].
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2, we introduce the three intuitive notions of users’ efficiency in online information
and social networks: link (the number of sources the user follows), in-flow (the amount of redundant
information she acquires), and delay efficiency (the delay with which she receives the information).
We then use these three measures to see how efficient users are at selecting their followees on Twitter.
Finally, we propose a method to help users be more efficient at selecting their followees in terms of
in-flow and delay efficiencies.
In Chapter 3, we first define non-divisive (high consensus) and divisive news. Then we perform a
preliminary empirical study of low and high consensus posts on social media platforms to compare
them. We propose a method to automatically identify non-divisive news from others (we also deploy
the "Purple Feed" system in which we highlight non-divisive posts from different publishers). Finally,
we propose and quantify the benefits of a potential strategy to spread non-divisive news to readers with
diverse political leanings.
In Chapter 4, we investigate how users perceive the truthfulness of stories. Then based on users’
perceptions, we identify three desired objectives to prioritize news for fact-checking. We finally propose
a method to prioritize stories for fact-checking in terms of the three objectives that we introduced.
In Chapter 5, we conclude with a short discussion of the main findings of the thesis and their




As we described in the previous chapter, the advent of social media has profoundly changed the
way people produce and consume information online in which people play both roles of producing and
consuming information. Social media sites such as Twitter, Tumblr, or Pinterest have become global
platforms for public self-expression and conversation. More formally, we can think of these sites as
large information networks where nodes i.e., users both create and consume information [Kwak et al.,
2010]. In this context, people play the information curators’ role by deciding which information to post,
which other people in the network to follow, and which information posted by other nodes to forward
[Romero and Kleinberg, 2010b, Christakis and Fowler, 2010].
However, the task of selecting information sources from potentially tens to hundreds of millions
of users poses serious challenges and raises important questions that have not yet been addressed.
For example, recent studies have observed that out of fear of missing out on important information,
users tend to follow too many other users [Hodas and Lerman, 2012]. In the process, they receive
a lot of redundant information [Babaei et al., 2015], become overloaded, and effectively miss the
information they are interested in [Gomez-Rodriguez et al., 2014, Lerman and Hogg, 2014]. Moreover,
it is very hard to ascertain the quality, relevance, and credibility of information produced by social
media users [Agichtein et al., 2008, Castillo et al., 2011, Farajtabar et al., 2015]. Also, many users rely
on their network neighborhood for discovering new sources of information, as observed by the large
number of triadic closures [Simmel, 1950, Granovetter, 1973, Romero and Kleinberg, 2010a] in link
creation.
In this scenario, we want to understand: 1) How efficient are the users of a social media site at
selecting which other users to follow to acquire information of their interest? and, 2) can we propose
methods to enable a user to acquire the same pieces of information from another set of users in the
social media site more efficiently?
To answer these intertwined questions, we view the structure of the information networks in social
media sites as the outcome of a network formation game [Kearns, 2012], where a node (i.e., user) links
to other nodes to solve a specific task (i.e., acquire information relevant to the user). In this thesis, we
propose a general computational framework to quantify and optimize the efficiency of links created by
users to acquire information.
In the rest of this chapter, we begin by giving a brief overview of the background and related work
in Section 2.1. We then introduce the new dataset to investigate users’ efficiency in Twitter as a real
information network. Next, to conduct our study, we needed to define the efficiency measurements. We
propose a general computational framework to quantify and optimize the efficiency of links created by
users to acquire information. Later, We also discuss the plausible reasons based on network structure
that lead users to be inefficient in real information networks. Finally, we conclude our work.
2.1 Background
Since the network structure has a significant effect on users’ efficiencies, we first briefly discuss the
related work to network structure and network properties. Then, we explain the different types of
networks categorized by [Newman, 2003].
2.1.1 Networks properties:
The advent of online social networks has seen an explosion of interest in networks’ structure, in which
researchers have made many studies about network structure and try to propose a model that could
explain the structure. Thus, many works focus on social network properties that arise in networks as
follows:
Power-law degree distributions :






which is the probability that the degree is greater than or equal to k. Many studies show that most
of the degree distribution of real-world networks are right-skewed. In other words, they follow
power-law in their tails: pk ∼ k−α, where, α is a constant exponent. Note that such power-law





k′−α ∼ k−α−1 (2.2)
In empirical studies of directed graphs like the Web, researchers have usually been given only
the individual distributions of in- and out-degree [Albert et al., 1999, Barabási et al., 2000,
Broder et al., 2000]. Networks with power-law degree distributions sometimes are referred to as
scale-free networks [Albert and Barabási, 2002, Barabási and Albert, 1999, Dorogovtsev and
Mendes, 2002, Strogatz, 2001].
The Small-World effect or small diameter :
There is a popular experiment carried out by Stanely Milgram in the 1960s, in which the goal
was to deliver the letter to a target by passing from person to person. The results show that the
letter reaches the target very fast, and this is the first direct demonstration of the small-world









Where dij is the geodesic distance between nodes i and j. Many studies show the mean shortest
path in real-world networks is small, and it is called a small-world effect [Albert and Barabási,
2002, Barabási, 2003, Fronczak et al., 2002, Newman, 2001].
Transitivity or Clustering :
If node u is connected to node v and node v to node w, then there is a high probability that node
u will also be connected node w. In social networks, transitivity means that your friend’s friend
is also likely to be your friend. In terms of network topology, transitivity interprets whereby the
presence of a heightened number of triangles in the network–sets of three nodes [Newman, 2003].
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Transitivity is quantified by clustering coefficient C:
C =
3 number of triangles in the network
number of connected triples of vertices
(2.4)
The clustering coefficient has been used in some other similar definitions widely in its own right
in the sociological literature [Dorogovtsev et al., 2002, John, 2000, Szabó et al., 2003].
Homophily :
Homophily provides us with a first, fundamental illustration of how a network’s surrounding
contexts can drive the formation of its links [Easley et al., 2010]. We can interpret homophily
as the tendency of individuals to associate and bond with similar others. In other words, people
with the same properties, such as age, gender, and political leaning, connect to share interesting
information with each other [Ferguson, 2017, McPherson et al., 2001, Krivitsky et al., 2009].
There are many other properties, such as navigability and network resilience in which explining
them are out of the this thesis’ scope.
2.1.2 Real world networks:
Here we discuss and explain different types of networks along with their properties. Newman in
[Newman, 2003] inspired by the paper by Watts and Strogatz [Watts and Strogatz, 1998] divide real
world networks to four categories: social networks, information networks, technological networks, and
biological networks.
Social networks: A social network is a set of people or groups of people that use internet-based social
media sites to stay connected with friends, family, colleagues, customers, or clients with some
pattern of contacts or interactions between them [John, 2000, Wasserman and Faust, 1994].
Social networking created based on friendship and social purpose [Rapoport and Horvath, 1961,
Fararo and Sunshine, 1964], business purpose [Jones and Handcock, 2003, Klovdahl et al., 1994,
Mirzasoleiman et al., 2012], sexual contacts [Liljeros et al., 2001], etc. have been studied largely
in the past [Galaskiewicz, 2016, Galaskiewicz and Marsden, 1978, Mariolis, 1975]. One of the
important experiments is the famous "small-world" experiment of Milgram [Milgram, 1967,
Travers and Milgram, 1977] that tells us about network structure. The most popular social media
16
sites are such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Instagram. The most important challenge to
study of social media sites was their size. Thus, many researchers tried to investigate the social
media sample with a smaller size to address this issue. However, those traditional social network
studies often suffer from inaccuracy problems and subjectivity because of the small sample size.
Accordingly, many researchers focus on relatively reliable smaller data such as collaboration
networks [Adamic et al., 2000, Amaral et al., 2000, Newman et al., 2001, Watts and Strogatz,
1998]. Mislove et al. in [Mislove et al., 2007], for the first time, studied to examine multiple
online social networks such as Flickr, YouTube, LiveJournal, and Orkut at scale to analyze the
structure of multiple online social networks. They report many interesting observations. For
instance, the networks contain a densely connected core of high-degree nodes; and that this core
links small groups of strongly clustered, low-degree nodes at the fringes of the network.
Information networks: There are two classic examples of information networks. 1) citations network in
which there is a directed link from article A to article B indicates that A cites B. In this network,
papers can only cite other papers that have already been written. The structure and properties
of the citation network have been studies by [Redner, 1998, Seglen, 1992]. One interesting
observation by [Price, 1965] is, that the number of scientists who have written k papers falls
off as k−α for some constant α that means the distribution of the numbers of papers written by
individual scientists follows a power law. 2) The World Wide Web network in which web pages
containing information, linked to other pages by hyperlinks such as wikipeida[Huberman, 2001].
The Web has been very heavily studied by Albert et al. [Albert et al., 1999, Barabási et al., 2000],
Kleinberg et al. [Kleinberg et al., 1999], and Broder et al. [Broder et al., 2000]. Other works
discuss other properties, such as having power-law in- and out-degree distributions [Barabási
et al., 2002, Albert et al., 1999, Broder et al., 2000, Flake et al., 2002, Kleinberg et al., 1999,
Kumar et al., 2000].
Technological networks: This kind of network refers to such networks typically designed to distribute
some commodity or resource. For instance, the electric power grid is considered a technological
network in which the goal is to transmit electricity to every part of a country. The structure of
this network is studied widely by [Amaral et al., 2000, Watts, 2000, Watts and Strogatz, 1998].
The other popular instances of technological networks that studied include the network of airline
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News domains, α = -1.7
YouTube, α = -2.7
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(b) The number of followees
Figure 2.1: The distributions of (a) the number of users posting a unique meme and (b) the number of followees
posting a specific type of meme at least once. For (a), a power-law is fitted (solid lines) and the
exponent α is given.
routes [Amaral et al., 2000], networks of roads [Mirzasoleiman et al., 2011, Babaei et al., 2011,
Kalapala et al., 2003], railways [Latora and Marchiori, 2002, Sen et al., 2003], pedestrian traffic
[Chowell et al., 2002], marker [Babaei et al., 2013], and river networks.
Biological networks: The last category of real networks is biological networks. The classic example of
a biological network is the network of metabolic pathways, which represents metabolic substrates
and products with directed edges joining them if a known metabolic reaction exists that acts on a
given substrate and produces a given product. Another popular example is the protein interaction
network that indicates the mechanistic physical interactions between proteins. Many studies
discussed the structure of this kind of network [Ito et al., 2001, Jeong et al., 2001, Maslov and
Sneppen, 2002, Solé and Pastor-Satorras, 2002].
Here in this thesis we are using social and information networks to address our concerns.
2.2 Dataset
We use a large Twitter dataset, as reported in previous work [Cha et al., 2010], which comprises the
following three types of information: profiles of 52 million users, 1.9 billion directed follow links
among these users, and 1.7 billion public tweets posted by the collected users. The link information
of the network is based on a snapshot taken at the time of data collection, in September 2009. In our
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work, we limit ourselves to tweets published during one week, from July 1, 2009 to July 7, 2009, and
filter out users that did not tweet before July 1, in order to be able to consider the social graph to be
approximately static. After this filtering, we have 395,093 active users, 39,382,666 directed edges, and
78,202,668 tweets.
Then, we sample 10,000 users at random out of the 395,093 active users and reconstruct their
timelines by collecting all tweets published by the (active) people they follow (among all the 395,093
users), build their ego-networks (i.e., who follows whom among the people they follow), and track all
the unique memes they were exposed to during the observation period. We consider four different types
of memes:
I. Hashtags. Hashtags are words or phrases inside a tweet which are prefixed with the symbol ”#”.
They provide a way for a user to generate searchable metadata, keywords or tags, in order to
describe her tweet, associate the tweet to a (trending) topic, or express an idea. Hashtags have
become ubiquitous and are an integral aspect of the social Web nowadays [Romero et al., 2011].
II. URLs. We extract all URLs mentioned inside tweets [Mislove et al., 2007]. Since most of URLs
in Twitter are shortened, we unwrap them by calling the API of the corresponding shortening
service. Here, we considered seven popular URL shorteners: bit.ly, tinyurl.com, is.gd, twurl.nl,
snurl.com, doiop.com and eweri.com, and discard any URL that could not be unwrapped. In
general, URLs correspond to online articles, posts, links, or websites.
III. News domains. We extract all domain names mentioned inside tweets that correspond to
mainstream media sites indexed by Google News [Leskovec et al., 2009]. News domains
correspond to media outlets, which may be specializing in the coverage of some topics or
perspectives.
IV. YouTube videos. We extract all URLs mentioned inside tweets that match the pattern
www.youtube.com/watch. Here, each of these URLs corresponds to a different YouTube
video.
The above memes provide different levels of granularity. For example, news domains are very
generic, while YouTube videos are fairly specific. In more detail, the set of active users mention 286, 219
unique hashtags, 379, 424 URLs, 18,616 news domains, and 19, 998 YouTube videos. Figure 2.1a
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shows the distribution of the number of unique posters for different types of memes, which follows
a power-law distribution. The tail of the distribution, as expected, is the heaviest for news domains,
while the lightest for YouTube videos. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2.1b, the tail of the distribution of
the number of followees tweeting at least one of the memes is also a power-law. In the remainder, we
consider only such followees.1 Also, we focus on users whose information network is fairly developed
by filtering out any user following less than 20 followees.
Note that, although our methodology does not depend on the particular choice of meme, it does
make two key assumptions. First, it assumes we can distinguish whether two memes are equal or differ.
Distinguishing certain memes such as hashtags may be trivial but distinguishing others, such as ideas,
may be very difficult. Second, it assumes that receiving several copies of the same meme from different
users does not provide additional information, even if different users express different opinions about
the meme. It would be interesting to relax the second assumption in future work.
Importantly, in 2009 Twitter did not have features such as “Lists” and “Personalized Suggestions”,
so the main way users received and processed information was through their feed, for which we have
complete data. The drawback of using older data is smaller number of users and social activity.
2.3 Different types of efficiency
In this work, we propose a computational framework to quantify users’ efficiency at selecting infor-
mation sources. Our framework is based on the assumption that the goal of users is to acquire a set of
unique pieces of information.
Our computational framework is based on the following key concept: given a set of unique ideas,
pieces of information, or more generally, memes I spreading through an information network, there is
an optimal set of nodes that, if followed, would enable us to get to know I. Thus we need to illustrate
that, what do we mean by an optimal set in which we consider the relevant notion of optimality for each
type of them. In this section, we introduce three different notions of efficiency, namely, link, in-flow
and delay efficiency. However, we could leverage this idea to define more complex notions of efficiency.
For example, we could define efficiency in terms of diversity, i.e., it would be interesting to find the set
of users that, if followed, would cover the same unique memes while maximizing the diversity of topics
1Considering all followees leads to qualitatively similar results, but lower absolute values of efficiency.
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Figure 2.2: Our notion of link efficiency, Elu. We define link efficiency as Elu = |U l(Iu)|/|Uu|, where Iu is the
set of (unique) memes (blue circles) a user u receives in her timeline by following a set of followees
Uu = {u1, . . . , u5} (left), and U l(Iu) = {u∗1, u∗2, u∗3} (right) is the minimal set cover (of users) that,
if followed, would provide the same set of memes Iu. In the illustration, each user ui posts the
memes within the associated ellipsoid. Hence, in this example, the link efficiency value is Elu = 3/5.
or per. This would provide a framework to mitigate the effects of the filtering bubble and echo chamber
present in current social media systems that we focus more on it in the next section of thesis.
For each type of efficiency, we provide a formal definition and propose a method to approximately
compute it with provable guarantees. Then, we use the methods to investigate the efficiency of Twitter
users at acquiring information as a real information network.
2.3.1 Link efficiency
As I mentioned above, to compute the efficiency we need to define the optimal set. Here, the optimal
set U l(I) is the one that contains the smallest number of users which cover the entire information the
user receive. Then, we compute link efficiency by comparing the number of people a user follows, i.e.,
the number of followees, with the size of the optimal set U l(I).
Finding the optimal set reduces to a minimum set cover problem, which can be solved using a
well-known and efficient greedy algorithm with provable guarantees [Johnson, 1973].
Consider a user u and the set of unique memes Iu she is exposed to through her feed in a given
time period, by following |Uu| users. Then, we define the optimal set U l(Iu) as the minimal set of
users that, if followed, would expose the user to at least Iu, and define the link efficiency of a user u at
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Input: set of all users U ; set of unique memes Iu; followee set Uu; set of memes Iv posted by
user v
1 Set U l = ∅;
2 Set X = Iu;
3 while X 6= ∅ do
4 Set v∗ = argminv∈U\U l
1
|X∩Iv | ;
5 Set U l = U l ∪ {v∗};
6 Set X = X\Iv∗ ;
7 end
Output: U l






where 0 ≤ Elu ≤ 1. If the number of users she follows coincides with the number of users in the
minimal set, then her efficiency value is Elu = 1. The larger the original number of followees in
comparison with the size of the minimal set, the smaller the link efficiency. Figure 2.2 illustrates our
definition of link efficiency.
Examples of link inefficiency: Our definition captures two types of link inefficiency, which we
illustrate by two extreme examples. If a user u follows |Uu| other users, each of them mentioning
different (disjoint) sets of memes, and there is another user v /∈ Uu that cover all the memes the
followees cover, then the user’s efficiency will be Elu = 1/|Uu|. If a user u follows |Uu| other users and
all these users mention exactly the same memes, then the user’s efficiency will be Elu = 1/|Uu| and
lim|Uu|→∞E
l
u = 0. The former type of link inefficiency is due to following users that individually post
too few memes, while the latter is due to following users that collectively produce too many redundant
memes.
Computing link efficiency: In practice, computing Elu, as defined by Eq. 2.5, reduces to finding
the minimal set of users U l(Iu), which can be cast as the classical minimum set cover problem [Karp,
1972]. Although the minimum set cover problem is NP-hard, we can approximate U l(Iu) using a
well-known and efficient greedy algorithm [Johnson, 1973], which returns an O(log d) approximation
of the minimum size set cover, where d = maxv∈U |Iv| is the maximum number of memes posted by
any user. Refer to Algorithm 1 for a full description of our procedure to approximate link efficiency.
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Link efficiency of Twitter users: We use now definitions of users’ efficiency defined by Eqs. 2.5
to investigate how efficient Twitter users are at acquiring four different types of memes: hashtags, URLs,
newsdomains and YouTube videos regarding link efficiency. we estimate the empirical probability
density function2 (PDF) for each type of efficiency and meme. We show the results in Figure 2.3, in
which we find several interesting patterns. As figure 2.3 depicts people are suboptimal regarding link
efficiency.



















Figure 2.3: The distributions of link efficiencyfor the four types of memes.
2.3.2 In-flow efficiency
The optimal set Uf (I) is the one that provides the least amount of tweets per time unit. Then, we
compute in-flow efficiency by comparing the amount of tweets per time unit a user receives from the
people she follows with the amount of tweets per time unit she would have received by following the
users in the optimal set Uf (I). Finding the optimal set reduces to a minimum weighted set cover
problem, which again can be solved efficiently with provable guarantees [Johnson, 1973].
Definition: Consider a user u and the set of unique memes Iu she is exposed to through her feed
in a given time period, by following |Uu| users. Then, we define the optimal set U f(Iu) as the set of
users that, if followed, would expose the user to, at least, Iu, while providing the least amount of tweets
per time unit, i.e., the minimum tweet in-flow. In particular, we define the in-flow efficiency of a user u
2The PDFs have been empirically estimated using kernel density estimation [Bowman and Azzalini, 2004].
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Figure 2.4: Our notion of in-flow efficiency, Efu . We define in-flow efficiency as Efu = f(Uf (Iu))/f(Uu),
where Iu is the set of (unique) memes (blue circles) a user receives in her timeline by following a
set of followees Uu = {u1, . . . , u5} (left), and Uf (Iu) = {u∗1, u∗2, u∗3} (right) is the set cover (of
users) with the smallest associated in-flow f(Uf (Iu)) that, if followed, would provide the same set
of memes Iu. In the illustration, each user ui posts the memes within the associated ellipsoid and
the red values in the ellipsoid represent the in-flow of each user. Hence, in this case, the in-flow
efficiency value is Efu = 30/60 = 0.5.





where f(Uu) denotes the amount of tweets produced by the set of users Uu per time unit (user u’s
in-flow) and 0 ≤ Efu ≤ 1. The in-flow efficiency Efu = 1 if user u’s in-flow coincides with the amount
of tweets per time unit posted by the users in the optimal set U f(Iu). Here, the larger is user u’s in-flow
in comparison with the amount of tweets per time unit posted by the users in the optimal set, the lower
is her in-flow efficiency.
Figure 2.4 illustrates our definition of in-flow efficiency using an example.
Examples of in-flow inefficiency: As in the case of link inefficiency, this definition captures
several types of in-flow inefficiency. First, it is easy to see that the example of extreme link inefficiency
due to following users posting exactly the same memes, also leads to in-flow inefficiency. if we assume
that each user produces the same amount of tweets per time unit. First, it is easy to see that the two
examples of extreme link inefficiency, due to following users that cover too few memes or due to
following redundant users, also lead to in-flow inefficiency, if we assume that each user produces the
same amount of tweets per time unit. Second, there is another type of in-flow inefficiency, which we
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Input: set of all users U ; set of unique memes Iu; number of tweets Nv posted by user v; set
of memes Iv posted by user v
1 Set U f = ∅;
2 Set X = Iu;
3 while X 6= ∅ do
4 Set v∗ = argminv∈U\U f
Nv
|Iv∩X| ;
5 Set U f = U f ∪ {v∗};
6 Set X = X\Iv∗
7 end
Output: U f
Algorithm 2: Greedy set cover for estimating in-flow efficiency
illustrate by an additional extreme example. Consider user u that follows |Uu| other users and the
amount of tweets produced by these followees has a divergent mean, e.g., it has a Pareto distribution
(a power law) with exponent α ≤ 1. Then, if there exists another set of |Uu| users mentioning the
same unique memes and the amount of tweets produced by them has a non-divergent mean, e.g., it is a
Pareto distribution with exponent α > 1, the user’s efficiency will converge to zero as |Uu| increases,
i.e., lim|Uu|→∞E
l
u = 0. Asymptotically, an infinite in-flow could be replaced with a finite in-flow that
include the same set of unique memes.
Computing in-flow efficiency: In practice, computing the optimal set of users U f(Iu) reduces
to solving the weighted set cover problem, which is also NP-hard. Analogously, we can find an
approximate solution to U f(Iu) using a greedy algorithm [Johnson, 1973], which returns an O(log d)
approximation to the set cover with minimum in-flow, where d = maxv∈U |Iv| is the maximum
number of memes posted by any user. Refer to Algorithm 2 for a full description of our procedure to
approximate in-flow efficiency with an approximation factor O(log d).
In-flow efficiency of Twitter users: We use now definitions of users’ efficiency defined by Eqs. 2.6
to investigate how efficient Twitter users are at acquiring four different types of memes: hashtags,
URLs, newsdomains and YouTube videos regarding inflow efficiency. As figure 2.5 depicts people are
suboptimal regarding link efficiency.
2.3.3 Delay efficiency
The optimal set U t(I) is the one that provides the memes as early as possible. Then, we compute delay
efficiency by comparing the average delay per meme that the user achieves through the people she
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Figure 2.5: The distributions of link efficiencyfor the four types of memes.
follows with the average delay she would achieve by following the users in the optimal set. Here, we
define the delay at acquiring a meme in a social media system as the difference between the time when
the user received the meme in her timeline and the time when the meme was first mentioned by a user
in the social media system. Finding the optimal set reduces to finding the set of users who made the
first mention of each of the memes in the social media system.
Definition: Consider a user u and the set of unique memes Iu she is exposed to through her feed
in a given time period, by following |Uu| users. Then, we define the optimal set U t(Iu) as the set of
users that, if followed, would expose the user to, at least, Iu, with the smallest time delay. Here, we
define the delay at acquiring a meme provided by a set Uu as the difference between the time when a
user in Uu first mentions the meme and the time when the meme was first mentioned during the given
time period by any user in the whole social media system. We then define the delay efficiency of a user
u at acquiring memes as
Etu =
1
1 + 〈ti − t0i 〉i∈Iu
, (2.7)
where ti is the time a user in Uu first mentions meme i, t0i is the time when the meme is first mentioned
by a user in the whole social media system, and 〈ti − t0i 〉i∈Iu is an average delay over all memes
received by user u, measured in days. Examples of delay inefficiency: The delay efficiency Etu = 1
if the followees of the user u are the first to post the set of memes Iu in the whole system. The delay
efficiency becomes lower than 1 when the user is exposed to the memes at later times than their time of
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Figure 2.6: Our notion of delay efficiency, Etu. We define delay efficiency as Etu = 1/(1 + 〈ti − t0i 〉i∈Iu),
where ti is the time in which a user receives meme i in her timeline, t0i is the time when the meme is
first mentioned by a user in the whole social media system, Iu is the set of (unique) memes (blue
circles) a user receives in her timeline by following a set of followees Uu = {u1, . . . , u5} (left), and
U t(Iu) = {u∗1, . . . , u∗5} (right) is the set cover (of users) that, if followed, would provide the same
set of memes Iu as early as possible. In the illustration, each user ui adopts the memes within the
associated ellipsoid for the first time after a delay indicated by the red number. Hence, the delay
efficiency is Etu = 1/(1 + 30/13).
birth. The larger is the average delay of received memes, the smaller is the delay efficiency. Figure 2.6
illustrates our definition of delay efficiency using an example.
Computing delay efficiency: In this case, we can compute the delay efficiency directly by finding
when each of the memes appeared for the first time in the system, without resorting to approximation
algorithms, as in the case of link and in-flow efficiencies. One can query the first time of appearance
for each meme in O(1) by building a mapping between memes and their first time of appearance in a
hashtable.
Delay efficiency of Twitter users: We use now definitions of users’ efficiency defined by Eqs. 2.7
to investigate how efficient Twitter users are at acquiring four different types of memes: hashtags,
URLs, newsdomains and YouTube videos regarding delay efficiency. As figure 2.7 depicts people are
suboptimal regarding delay efficiency.
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Figure 2.7: The distributions of link efficiencyfor the four types of memes.
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Figure 2.8: The distribution of the ratio between the number of received tweets and unique memes.
2.4 Intersting observations regarding Twitter users’ efficiency
Once we have the three definitions of users’ efficiency and investigate how efficient Twitter users are
at acquiring four different types of memes: hashtags, URLs, news domains, and YouTube videos, we
find several interesting patterns. First, all PDFs resemble a normal distribution, however, their peaks
(modes) and widths (standard deviations) differ across efficiencies and type of memes. For most users
and most types of memes, the efficiency value is significantly below one, giving empirical evidence that
users are typically sub-optimal. Second, while the PDFs for link (Figure 2.3) and delay (Figure 2.7)
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Figure 2.9: The average link and in-flow efficiencies versus the percentage of covered memes.
efficiencies look quite similar, the in-flow efficiency differs significantly (Figure 2.5). Third, users
are most efficient at acquiring YouTube videos, followed by URLs and hashtags, and news domains.
This order coincides with the ordering of the exponents of the corresponding power-law distribution of
memes’ popularity (Figure 2.1a), i.e., the exponent of the power-law (its absolute value) is the highest
for YouTube links, followed by URLs and hashtags, and finally for news domains. Note that the higher
the exponent is, the higher the proportion of non-popular memes with respect to the popular ones,
and thus one can conclude that users are more efficient at acquiring non-popular memes than popular
memes. A plausible explanation is that users posting non-popular memes are likely to be included in the
optimal set, since there is nobody else who posts these memes and, as a consequence, the optimal set
differs less from the original set of followees. Moreover, note that in Figure 2.5, the in-flow efficiency
of both news domains and YouTube videos is shifted to the left (i.e., presents much lower efficiency
values) compared to the link efficiency in Figure 2.3. This shift is due to the fact that, as shown in
Figure 2.8, ratio between the total number of received tweets and unique memes is much larger for
unique news domains and YouTube video memes than for hashtags and URLs, which in turn, translates
into a lower in-flow efficiency.
In the above measurements, we estimated the probability density functions of user’s efficiency
considering full coverage of the received memes. Importantly, it is straightforward to extend our
definitions of link and in-flow efficiencies to account for partial coverage, by simply considering a
set of users that, if followed, would expose the user to, at least, a percentage of the unique memes
Iu, by stopping the greedy algorithm whenever the given percentage is reached. Note, however, that
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Figure 2.10: The average popularity of covered memes as a function of the percentage of covered memes.
computing the efficiency for a partial coverage based on the full set of followees would be unfair, since
some of the followees in Uu may be not tweeting any of the covered memes. Thus, for the purpose of
computing the efficiencies for partial coverage, we take into account only the users in Uu who tweet at
least one of the covered memes.
Figure 2.9 shows the average link and in-flow efficiencies against coverage for the same four
memes. As one may have expected, the higher the coverage, the higher the link and in-flow efficiency,
since the memes that are covered first by the greedy algorithm are the popular ones, as shown in
Figure 2.10. This result confirms that users are more efficient at acquiring less popular information, but
less so at acquiring more popular information. A plausible explanation is that less popular information
is produced by only a handful of users and so the optimization is limited to this set of users.
Finally, we investigate if our results are consistent across different time periods. In particular, we
measure user efficiency based on time periods of different lengths: one, two, four and eight weeks. In
Figure 2.11a, we can observe that as we increase the period, there are more unique memes there to
cover, which results in an increase in the efficiency. However, the distribution of efficiency is nearly
unchanged for 80% coverage (Figure 2.11b). Thus, the findings presented in this study are qualitatively
robust to the choice of time period. Additionally, we find that the choice of the week does not influence
the distributions of efficiency, however, these results are not shown due to space limitation.
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Figure 2.11: In-flow efficiency measured for hashtags appearing in the time periods of different lengths. The
results for other efficiencies and meme types are qualitatively the same.
2.5 Cross efficiency
In our definitions of efficiency, the optimal set for a given user is the set of users that minimizes the
number of links, in-flow or delay, while covering the same set of unique memes. However, this naturally
raises the question as to how efficient the optimal sets for a given definition of efficiency are in terms
of the other definitions. For example, how efficient is the link-optimal set with respect to in-flow or
delay efficiency? In this section, we first address this question, then introduce the idea of finding sets of
users that jointly optimize multiple notions of efficiency, and finally develop a heuristic algorithm that
simultaneously improves both in-flow and delay efficiency of users.
2.5.1 Cross-efficiency of optimal sets
Given a user u and the set of unique memes Iu she is exposed to in a given time period, our definitions
of efficiency compare the original set of followees with the optimal sets U l(Iu), U f(Iu) and U t(Iu)
in terms of number of links, in-flow and average delay, respectively. Here, we assess the efficiency
of the optimal sets for each definition of efficiency in terms of the other definitions, which we call
cross-efficiencies.
More specifically, we compute them as follows:
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(a) Effect of in-flow efficiency optimization on link
efficiency




















(b) Effect of delay efficiency optimization on link
efficiency
Figure 2.12: The effect of optimization of in-flow and delay efficiencies on link efficiency, plotted as the ratio of
the efficiency in the optimized network and the original network against the number of followees.
The dashed line marks the ratio equal to 1, which corresponds to the lack of change in the efficiency
due to the respective optimization.








Since we would like to know if an efficiency of an optimized information network is increased in
comparison with the efficiency of the original network we focus on measuring the ratio of an efficiency






If the ratio is higher than one for the given optimization algorithm, then the corresponding efficiency
is improved by that algorithm with respect to the original set of followees. If the ratio is below one then
the respective efficiency is decreased by the optimization algorithm. As Figure 2.12a and b depict, the
optimal sets for news domains are more efficient than the original sets. This observation may happen
due to the following reason: news domains tend to be more popular than the other types of memes (as
shown in Figure 2.1). As a consequence, a user may receive multiple copies of the same news domain
from various followees, and it is very easy to find efficient sets in terms of in-flow; it is enough to
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simply remove some of their followees from the network to improve both link and in-flow efficiencies.3
The ratio for other memes tends to be below one or close to one, which indicates that optimizing for
inflow or delay efficiencies results in decreased link efficiency. We did the same think to compute the








and the delay efficiency of the optimal sets for link and in-flow efficiency, i.e.,
Etu,l =
1
1 + 〈tli − t0i 〉i∈Iu
and Etu,f =
1
1 + 〈tfi − t0i 〉i∈Iu
,
where tli is the time a user in U l(Iu) first mentions meme i and tfi is the time a user in U f(Iu) first
mentions meme i.
To see if an efficiency of an optimized information network is increased in comparison with the




























(a) Effect of link efficiency optimization on in-flow
eff.



















(b) Effect of delay efficiency optimization on in-flow
eff.
Figure 2.13: The effect of optimization of link and delay efficiencies on in-flow efficiency
3In fact, over 85% of users receive less unique news domains than they have followees.
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(a) Effect of link efficiency optimization on delay eff.















(b) Effect of in-flow efficiency optimization on delay
eff.
Figure 2.14: The effect of optimization of link and in-flow efficiencies on delay efficiency
As Figures 2.13 and 2.14 show, the ratio tends to be below one or close to one for most meme
types, which indicates that optimizing for one definition of efficiency generally results in decreased
efficiency with respect to the other two definitions.
However, there is one exception similar to effect on link efficiency, as Figure 2.13b show, the
optimal sets for news domains are more efficient than the original sets. We discussed the plausible
reason earlier. In Figures 2.13(a) and (b) we note that the improvement in the in-flow efficiency tends to
grow with the number of followees due to the increased number of redundant (non-unique) information
received by the users who follow many other people. In terms of delay efficiency, the optimal sets for
link and in-flow efficiency for hashtags and URLs are more efficient than the original sets (blue and red
points in Figures 2.14), however, they are less efficient for news domains and YouTube videos (green
and teal points in Figures 2.14). In Figures 2.14, the improvement in the delay efficiency tends to drop
with the number of followees because it is likely that users who receive many copies of the same meme
receive it early on. Thus, for users with many followees, it is harder to improve the delay efficiency.
2.5.2 Joint-optimization of efficiencies
So far, we have looked for optimal sets of users in terms of a single efficiency (be it link, in-flow or
delay). Moreover, in the previous section, we have shown that optimal sets in terms of a single efficiency
typically decrease the other efficiencies. Therefore, one could imagine developing an algorithm a
looking for sets of users that are optimized with respect to several efficiencies; in other words, a
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(a) Effect on link efficiency

















(b) Effect on in-flow efficiency














(c) Effect on delay efficiency
Figure 2.15: The effect of optimization of both in-flow and delay efficiencies on different types of efficiencies,
plotted as the ratio of the affected efficiency of the optimized network and the original network
against the number followees.
multi-objective algorithm. Given such an algorithm a, we could compute the efficiency of the optimal










1 + 〈tai − t0i 〉i∈Iu
where tai is the time a user in U a(Iu) first mentions meme i. Ideally, we would like to find optimal sets
that are efficient with respect to the considered quantities. Here, as a proof of concept, we next develop
a heuristic method to find sets of users optimized with respect to both in-flow and delay.
Joint optimization of in-flow and delay efficiency
We leverage the greedy algorithm from the weighted set cover problem to design a heuristic method that
finds sets of users with high in-flow and delay efficiencies, while delivering the same unique memes to
the user (refer to Algorithm 3). In particular, in the heuristic method, the weights are powers of tweets
in-flow Nαv and average delay T
β
v over all unique memes produced by the user v. The exponents α and
β can be readily adjusted to induce higher or lower in-flow efficiency and delay efficiency, respectively.
Here, we experiment with α = 1 and β = 0.5, which achieves a good balance between in-flow and
delay efficiency.
We summarize the ratio of link, in-flow and delay efficiency of the set of users provided by
our heuristic method and the original set of followees in Figure 2.15. We discus several interesting
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Input: set of all users U ; set of unique memes Iu; set of memes Iv posted by user v
1 Set U* = ∅;
2 Set X = Iu;
3 while X 6= ∅ do





5 Set U* = U* ∪ {v∗};
6 Set X = X\Iv∗
7 end
Output: U*
Algorithm 3: Greedy set cover for jointly optimizing in-flow and delay efficiencies
observations. First, since the algorithm does not optimize with respect to the number of links, the
link efficiency is not improved by this algorithm, i.e., the ratio between the link efficiency of the set
provided by the heuristic method and the link efficiency of the original set of followees ratio is around
or below 1 for three out of four meme types. Second, we find that both in-flow and delay efficiencies
are significantly increased over the efficiency of the original set of followees for all types of memes.
The in-flow efficiency is, on average, 7.4-times higher for news domains, 1.8-times higher for hashtags,
1.3-times higher for URLs, 1.2-times higher for YouTube videos. The delay efficiency is, on average,
1.8-times higher for news domains, 1.4-times higher for hashtags, 1.4-times higher for URLs, 1.2-times
higher for YouTube videos. There is always an increase in in-flow and delay efficiencies independently
of the number of followees that the users have originally. However, while the improvement in the
in-flow efficiency tends to be larger for users with many followees, the improvement in the delay
efficiency is larger for users with fewer followees. Thus, we conclude that our algorithm increases both
in-flow and delay efficiency of users.
2.6 Sructure of ego networks: original vs. optimized
In the previous sections, we have introduced three meaningful definitions of efficiency and applied
them to show that Twitter users tend to choose their information sources inefficiently. In this section,
we investigate the rationale behind this sub-optimal behavior by comparing the structure of the user’s
ego-networks associated with both the original set of followees and the sets optimized for efficiency.
Here, we define a user’s ego-network as the network of connections (who-follows-whom) between the
ego user and her followees.
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(a) Original (b) Minimal set cover
Figure 2.16: Ego-networks for a Twitter user (red node). Some users (black nodes) only belong to one of the
ego-networks while others (gray nodes) belong to both. The original ego-network contains more
triangles than the ego-network induced by the minimal set cover, whose structure is closer to a star.
First, as an example, we take one particular user and illustrate the structure of her original ego-
network and the ego-network of an optimal set in terms of link efficiency (Figure 2.16). By visual
comparison of both ego-networks, we can see that while the ego-network induced by the optimal set
displays a structure much closer to a star, the original ego-network contains many more triangles and
higher clustering coefficient. Due to its proportionally lower number of triangles, the optimal set is not
discoverable by triadic closure [Simmel, 1950, Granovetter, 1973, Romero and Kleinberg, 2010a] or
information diffusion [Bakshy et al., 2012], which have been recently shown to be two major driving
forces for link creation in social networks [Weng et al., 2013, Myers and Leskovec, 2014, Antoniades
and Dovrolis, 2013].
Remarkably, this phenomenon happens systematically across all users, efficiency definitions, and
types of memes, as displayed in Figure 2.17, which shows the distribution of local clustering coefficient
(LCC) for the users’ original ego-networks and the ego-networks induced by different optimized sets.
We find that while the LCC distribution for the original ego-networks is well spread and centered
at 0.15 − 0.30, the LCC distributions for the ego-networks induced by the optimal sets are skewed
towards zero.4 One could still think that this is simply a consequence of differences in the number of
followees, i.e., the size of the ego-network. However, Figure 2.18 rules out this possibility by showing a
4Note that the distribution of clustering coefficient of inflow-delay optimized network is located between distributions of
in-flow optimized and delay optimized ego-networks.
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Figure 2.17: The distributions of local clustering coefficient (LCC) of the original ego-network (green circles)
and the ego-networks optimized for link (blue circles), in-flow (red circles), delay (teal circles),
and inflow-delay efficiency (black circles) for: (a) hashtags, (b) URLs, (c) news domains, (d) and
YouTube videos.
striking difference of several orders of magnitude between the LCC of the original ego-networks and the
ego-networks induced by the optimal sets across a wide range of number of followees. These findings
suggest that the way in which social media users discover new people to follow (e.g., triadic closure or
information diffusion) or receive recommendations (e.g., pick people in a 2-hop neighborhood [Adamic
and Adar, 2003]) can lead to sub-optimal information networks in terms of (link, in-flow and delay)
efficiency.
We have argued that optimal sets typically differ from the original set of followees due to their
low number of triangles in the associated ego-networks, and thus lack of discoverability. However,
are optimal sets with higher number of triangles in efficient ego-networks easier to discover for users?
Figure 2.19 answers this question positively by showing the average local clustering coefficient in the
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Figure 2.18: Average local clustering coefficient versus the number of followees in the original ego-network
(green circles) and the ego-networks optimized for link (blue squares), in-flow (red triangles), delay
(teal triangles), and inflow-delay efficiency (black triangles).
ego-network induced by the optimal set against the overlap between the users in the optimal set and the
original set of followees. Here, by overlap we mean the fraction of users in the optimal set that are also
in the original set of followees. In particular, we find a positive correlation (Pearson’s 0.07 < r < 0.55,
p < 10−10) between the local clustering coefficient and the overlap, which indicates that if the nodes in
the optimal set are discoverable through triadic closure, the user may be more likely to find them and
decide to follow them.
2.7 Summary
In conclusion, we propose a computational framework to quantify users’ efficiency at selecting infor-
mation sources. Our framework is based on the assumption that the goal of users is to acquire a set
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Figure 2.19: Local clustering coefficient of the optimized ego-networks versus the overlap between the original
ego-network and the ego-networks optimized for link (blue squares), in-flow (red triangles), delay
(teal triangles), and inflow-delay efficiency (black triangles).
of unique pieces of information. To quantify user’s efficiency, we ask if the user could have acquired
the same pieces of information from another set of sources more efficiently. We define three different
notions of efficiency – link, in-flow, and delay – corresponding to the number of sources the user
follows, the amount of (redundant) information she acquires and the delay with which she receives
the information. Our definitions of efficiency are general and applicable to any social media system
with an underlying information network, in which every user follows others to receive the information
they produce. In our experiments, we measure the efficiency of Twitter users at acquiring different
types of information. We find that Twitter users exhibit sub-optimal efficiency across the three notions
of efficiency, although they tend to be more efficient at acquiring nonpopular pieces of information
than they are at acquiring popular pieces of information. We then show that this lack of efficiency is
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a consequence of the triadic closure mechanism by which users typically discover and follow other
users in social media. Thus, our study reveals a tradeoff between the efficiency and discoverability of
information sources. Finally, we develop a heuristic algorithm that enables users to be significantly
more efficient at acquiring the same unique pieces of information.
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CHAPTER 3
Break the filter bubbles that users get trapped
With an increasing number of people relying on social media platforms to acquire their information,
there have been growing concerns about the impacts such a shift can have on their news consumption.
Although politically diverse news publishers post stories, it has been observed that readers often focus
on the news, which reinforces their pre-existing views, leading to ‘filter bubble’ or ‘echo chamber’
effects. These biases in the news consumption may lead to an increase in societal polarization. To
combat this, some recent systems such as Wall Street Journal’s ‘Blue Feed, Red Feed’ system nudge
readers toward diverse stories with different points of view by showing both sides of a topic posted
from biased publishers. However, recent work shows that exposure to opposing views on social media
can increase political polarization [Bail et al., 2018]. Alternatively, we present a complementary
approach which identifies non-divisive (high consensus) ‘purple’ posts that generate similar reactions
from readers with different political leanings. We also propose and quantify the benefits of a strategy to
spread high consensus news across readers with diverse political leanings. The aim is to spread high
consensus news, and quantify the significant decrease in the disparity of users’ news exposure.
We begin by giving a brief overview of the related work and background. Then, in the first part
of this chapter (Section 3.2), we discuss identifying non-divisive content. Finally, in the second part
of this chapter (Section 3.3), we focus on studying the properties of non-divisive news to see if it is
possible to propagate non-divisive news broadly across society (may help to break filter bubbles and
lead to decrease polarization in society).
3.1 Background
We review diverse and polarized news dissemination and information propagation in social networks.
We then briefly discuss different supervised learning methods and Indipendent Cascade model (IC)
in which we consider them for detection of non-divisive news (high consensus) and our propagation
model, respectively.
3.1.1 News consumption polarization on social media
Several recent studies have investigated the dissemination of news in social networks [Bhattacharya
and Ram, 2012], focusing on biases [Chakraborty et al., 2016a], political news [An et al., 2014], and
the characteristics of spreaders [Hu et al., 2012].
Traditionally, professional news organizations played a major role in spreading news by selectively
presenting news stories to citizens [Shoemaker and Vos, 2009]. Accordingly, news media had a high
impact on political issues and public opinions [Groseclose and Milyo, 2005, Chiang and Knight,
2011]. Several works have focused on understanding how and to what extent news media outlets can
impact people and society, such as the White Helmets in Syria [Starbird et al., 2018] and the 2016 US
presidential campaign [Rizoiu et al., 2018, Ribeiro et al., 2019].
By examining cross-ideological exposure through content and network analysis, [Himelboim et al.,
2013] showed that political talk on Twitter is highly partisan and users are unlikely to be exposed to
cross-ideological content through their friendship network. Other studies also report similar findings
such as users’ higher willingness to communicate with other like-minded social media users [Liu and
Weber, 2014].
To understand the political bias in social media better, many researchers have studied political
polarization on Twitter by analyzing different groups’ behavior. [Conover et al., 2011] showed that
Twitter users usually retweet the users who have the same political ideology as themselves, making
the retweeting network structure highly partitioned into left- and right-leaning groups with limited
connections between them.
Previous works have mostly investigated news media political bias, and the bias introduced in the
content of the news, by different methods such as crowdsourcing and machine learning [Budak et al.,
2016, Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010, Babaei et al., 2018]. Here, we propose a complementary approach
[Babaei et al., 2018], in which the goal is to inject diversity in users’ information consumption by
identifying non-divisive (high consensus) yet informative news, based on using features such as the
publishers’ political leaning.
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We show that non-divisive and divisive (high and low consensus) posts are equally popular and
cover broadly similar topics. Then, we investigate how non-divisive and divisive news spread through
social media and their potential impacts on readers biased exposure, which is one of our main concerns
in this thesis.
3.1.2 Collecting users’ political leanings
We inferred every user’s political leaning as a score between -1 and +1, using the method of [Kulshrestha
et al., 2017], in which, we needed to collect their followees. Inferring the political leaning of a given
Twitter user u is based on the following steps – (i) generating two representative sets of users who are
known to have a democratic or republican bias, (ii) inferring the topical interests of u by looking at her
followees, and (iii) examining how closely u’s interests match with the interests of the representative
sets of democratic and republican users. Formally,
leaning(u) = cos_sim(Iu, ID)− cos_sim(Iu, IR), (3.1)
where Iu is the interest vectors of user u, and ID, IR are normalized aggregate interest vectors for
the democrat seed set (ID) and the republican seed set (IR). Similarity between interest vectors are
measured by cosine similarity.
3.1.3 Information propagation in social networks
The process of increasing information propagation and network diffusion by identifying and choosing
the optimal set of individuals that utilize social influences to maximize adoption or reception of
information in society has been widely studied [Goyal et al., 2013, Richardson and Domingos, 2002,
Kempe et al., 2003, Hartline et al., 2008]. [Richardson and Domingos, 2002] considered influence
maximization as an algorithmic problem. To solve it, the authors used a heuristic approach to find an
initial set of nodes to maximize the number of further adapters. The effectiveness of these strategies
is studied by Kempe et al. [2003] under different social contagion models such as Linear Threshold
(LT) and Independent Cascade (IC) models. They showed that finding the optimal solution is NP-hard.
Motivated by its hardness, Kempe et al. used influence function properties such as monotonicity and
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submodularity to obtain provable approximation guarantees. Since then, various related extensions
have been studied [Goyal et al., 2013, Bharathi et al., 2007, Budak et al., 2011, Carnes et al., 2007].
Here our goal is to propagate news with less disparity among users with different political leanings.
Recent studies on fair influence maximization [Ali et al., 2019a, Tsang et al., 2019, Khajehnejad et al.,
2020a] are the most related ones to our work. However, their approaches may not be directly applicable
to online networks such as Twitter. We show that in social media, the political leaning of the seeds can
make a considerable bias in users’ exposure to news. In particular, we observe that high consensus news
posted by neutral publishers has the lowest disparity for spreading among all users (liberal, conservative,
and neutral). We use the fair influence maximization method proposed by [Ali et al., 2019a] as a
baseline.
3.1.4 Supervised learning methods
We use supervised learning approaches to identify whether a news tweet has high consensus or low
consensus using the features described later. Thus, we applied three different categories of supervised
learning.
I. Non-probabilistic classifier: Since model built by SVM training approach assigns new data to
one class or the another, it is known as non-probabilistic classifier. In this work, our goal is to
distinguish the high and low consensus tweets. In other words, we want to create a model based
on our training data to detect a new tweet as a high or low consensus. Thus, SVM is one of the
suitable classifiers for our goal.
II. Probabilistic classifier:
. Naive Bayes: This method is also known as posterior class probabilities. Since Naive Bayes
can efficiently handle items with sparse features and also assumes the strong independency
between the features, it is a popular baseline for text categorization. It also is also very
helpful for tweet classification because there is 140-character limit for each tweet that
means each tweet includes a few features. Thus, we consider this classifier for our goal.
. Logistic Regression: This classifier is suitable for dependent features. When the output
contains two classes, then binary logistic regression helps efficiently. Since we are using
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different categories of features that some of them depend on others, then it is desirable to
apply this method.
III. Ensemble classifier: Random forest is a kind of ensemble algorithms. It uses multiple machine
learning algorithms to achieve better accuracy. Multiple decision trees are used to classify the
data. To classify the test data, the algorithm put down the data in each tree and each tree votes for
that. Then, it chooses the highest vote for classification . It assigns estimation and weight to each
variable which present importance of each feature . Random forest achieves high accuracy and it
runs efficiently on large data set
3.1.5 Independent cascade model (IC)
In the IC model, information propagates through every edge (v, w) with probability pvw. We have a set
of discrete time steps which we denote with t = {0, 1, 2, · · · }. At t = 0, the initial seed set S ⊆ V is
activated. At every time step t > 0, a node v ∈ V which was activated at time t− 1 can activate its
inactivated neighbors w with probability pvw. The model assumes that once a node is activated, it stays
active throughout the whole process and each node has only one chance to activate its neighbors. The
described process stops at time t > 0 if no new node gets activated at this time. We note that the IC
model is a stochastic process, in which a node u can influence its neighbors w based on the Bernoulli
distribution with success probability puw. A possible outcome of the process can be denoted via a set
of timestamps {tv ≥ 0 : v ∈ V}, where tv represents the time at which a node v ∈ V is activated.
3.2 Identifying non-divisive content from controversial topics
Within our societies, there are many topics for which different subgroups hold opposing ideological
positions. For example, there are primarily two distinct political affiliations in the U.S.: Republicans
(the ‘red’ group) and Democrats (the ‘blue’ group). Social media platforms provide a wide variety
of news sources covering this ideological spectrum, yet many users largely limit themselves to news
stories which reinforce their pre-existing views. This selective exposure, where red users read red news
and blue users read blue news, leads to a more politically fragmented, less cohesive society [Liu and
Weber, 2014]. Further, this selective exposure effect is often amplified by social media platforms which
recognize users’ preferences and thence recommend more red news to red users and more blue news to
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blue users. While this approach may work well for recommending consumer goods such as movies
or music, there are concerns that such stilted news selections limit exposure to differing perspectives
and lead to the formation of ‘filter bubbles’ or ‘echo chambers’ [Bakshy et al., 2015, Bozdag, 2013,
Flaxman et al., 2016, Pariser, 2011], resulting in a worrying increase in societal polarization [Sunstein,
2002, Schkade et al., 2007].
To combat this polarization, a number of systems intended to promote diversity have been proposed.
These systems deliberately expose users to different points of view by showing red news to blue users,
and blue news to red users; or by showing both red and blue news to both red and blue user groups. The
hope is to nudge users to read viewpoints which disagree with their own [Munson et al., 2013a, Park
et al., 2009b]. A prominent example is the Wall Street Journal’s ‘Blue feed, Red feed’ system [Keegan,
2017], which presents posts from the most extreme news publishers on Facebook, with the aim of
showing diametrically opposed perspectives on news stories.
Unfortunately, however, such systems have had limited success. While some diversity-seeking
users enjoy the added perspectives, many users either ignore or reject disagreeable points of view
[Munson and Resnick, 2010]. Indeed, by confronting users with the most radical posts from the other
ideological side, such systems may even increase polarization by encouraging users to retreat to a more
entrenched version of their initial position [Lord and Ross, 1979, Miller et al., 1993, Munro and Ditto,
1997].
In this work, we propose a complementary approach by identifying and highlighting news posts
which are likely to evoke similar reactions from the readers, irrespective of their political leanings. We
define these non-divisive or ‘purple’ news posts to be those with high consensus, i.e., having a general
agreement in their readers’ reactions to them. We propose that these high consensus purple stories could
be recommended to both red and blue users, evoking a more unified response across society, which we
hope might lead to lower segregation in information consumption [Chakraborty et al., 2017], and might
help to promote greater understanding and cohesion among people. In Table 3.1, we show a sample of
red, blue and purple news stories to highlight the differences between the three types of stories.1




Fox News: Schieffer Slams Trump: Comey Firing Reminds Me
ofJFK-Oswald ConspiraciesSource, 55 Retweets, 510 Replies,
149 Likes.
Conservative Fox News: @POTUS: “All of the Democrats, I mean, they
hated Jim Comey. They didn’t like him, they wanted him
fired".https://t.co/1ebOtqfIOc 491 Retweets, 293 Replies, 2k
Likes.
Politico: Analysis: Is this a constitutional crisis? Legal ex-
perts size up the Comey firing. http://politi.co/2qPEN1c, 210
Retweets, 63 Replies, 254 Likes.
Low Consensus
The New York Times: What all the Russia investigations have
done and what couldhappen nextSource, 131 Retweets, 52
Replies, 226 Likes.
Liberal Salon: Report: Trump "revealed more information to the Rus-
sian ambassadorthan we have shared with our own allies" 51
Retweets, 14 Replies, 34 Likes
CNN: Is Donald Trump the "little boy President"? A
@CNNOpinioncontributor takes a closer look at his latest
moveshttp://cnn.it/2pE1Uaq, 179 Retwees, 264 Replies, 468
Likes.
High Consensus
Fox News: @johnrobertsFox on firing of James Comey: "This
came as a shockto literally everyone, including the @FBI Direc-
tor." #TheFiveSource, 156 Retweets, 259 Replies, 574 Likes.
AP: BREAKING: Senate intelligence committee invites fired
FBI DirectorComey to appear in closed session next Tuesday,
2.7K Retweets, 176 Replies, 5k Likes
Politico: James Comey told lawmakers he wanted more re-
sourcesfor Russia probe http://politi.co/2r2HxpfSource, 132
Retweets, 40 Replies, 204 Likes.
Table 3.1: Samples of high and low consensus news posts. First and second rows include low consensus news
with conservative and liberal leaning respectively.
1. How can we define the consensus of news posts in order to operationalize the identification of
high consensus purple posts?
2. Do helpful purple news posts exist on social media?
3. How do purple posts compare with low consensus (blue or red only) posts?
4. Can we automate the identification of consensus of news posts on social media in order to
discover purple posts?
Our work provides a fresh tool which we hope will help to break filter bubbles, encourage healthier
interaction between population subgroups, and lead to a more cohesive society.
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3.2.1 Consensus definition and measurement
A key step of our work is to understand whether news posts with high consensus exist in social media.
To verify this, first we need to operationalize the concept of ‘consensus’ for news posts, i.e., to provide
a definition for consensus that allows one to measure it, both empirically and quantitatively. Second,
we need to construct ground truth datasets to measure consensus of real news posts in social media.
Next, we describe how we performed these steps.
Operationalizing consensus for news posts
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, consensus is defined as “a general agreement”.2 Inspired
by this definition, we consider a post to have high consensus if there is a general agreement in readers’
reaction to it, irrespective of their own political leaning. Specifically, in the context of US politics, a
post would have high consensus if the reaction of Democrat readers to the post is similar to the reaction
of Republican readers. For a given social media post, we measure the reaction of Democrats and
Republicans as whether the readers agree or disagree with the content of a post. Formally, we measure
the amount of consensus as





where #Ddisagree and #Rdisagree respectively denote the number of Democrats and Republicans who
disagree with the post, while #D and #R are the total number of Democrats and Republicans.3 A
consensus value closer to 1 indicates that both Democrats and Republicans disagreed with it to similar
extents, thereby indicating high consensus; while a value closer to 0 is indicative of low consensus.
Note that there is no unique way to measure consensus. In addition to Equation 3.2, it can also
be measured in terms of attitude polarization indices such as coherence, divergence, intensity, and
parity [Persily, 2015]. The common requirement for these indices is attitude response data, which in
our context is provided by the support and negative response from the readers. We use our definition
presented in Equation 3.2 due to its simplicity, while still effectively capturing the nuances of consensus
as in the other measures.
2See en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/consensus.
3Considering the fraction of readers from each side who disagree with a post implicitly takes into account the fraction of













Blue Feed, Red Feed dataset
Twitter dataset
Figure 3.1: Distribution (CDF) of consensus values of news posts from the two datasets.
Measuring consensus of news posts on social media
Using our definition of consensus, we conducted an Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) experiment to
quantify the consensus of two distinct datasets of news posts:
(i) Blue Feed, Red Feed dataset - Using the Wall Street Journal’s ‘Blue Feed, Red Feed’ system [Keegan,
2017], we collected the top 10 posts from each of the liberal and conservative sides for the queries
“Trump” and “healthcare”, giving us a total of 40 news posts.
(ii) Twitter dataset - We also collected 40 news posts tweeted by each of the following 10 news
publishers with well known political biases varying from liberal to neutral to conservative: Slate, Salon,
New York Times, CNN, AP, Reuters, Politico, Fox News, Drudge Report, and Breitbart News; giving
us a total of 400 posts. These news posts were collected during the one week period of 9th to 15th May,
2017.
In this experiment, we only recruited AMT workers from the US and at the end of the experiment,
we also collected their political leanings. We showed every news post to workers and asked them for
their reaction to the post by selecting one out of three options – agreement, neutral or disagreement.4
After the experiment, applying Equation 3.2 to responses from an equal number (seven) of Democrat
and Republican AMT workers, we computed the consensus values for the news posts in our two datasets.
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution (CDF) of consensus values for the news posts from our datasets.
We observe that news posts from the ‘Blue Feed, Red Feed’ dataset are skewed towards lower values of
4We presented the questions in the following form:
Tweet: “Salon: Can anyone find an economist who thinks Trump’s tax cuts will pay for themselves? https://t.co/Hz6JvQHvXB"
Question: Do you agree with this tweet?































































































Figure 3.2: Number of high and low consensus news posted on Twitter during 9th-15th May, 2017. (A) shows
the number of high and low consensus news for 10 selected publishers, and (B) shows the aggregated
result for conservative, liberals, and neutral publishers.
consensus, indicating that the readers from the two different parties have different reactions to them;
whereas the random news posts from the 10 publishers from the Twitter dataset have a noticeable skew
towards higher consensus. Our observations suggest that while news outlets on social media do publish
posts with varying degrees of consensus, systems such as ‘Blue Feed, Red Feed’, which highlight posts
from extremely biased news outlets, tend to pick lower consensus content which leads readers with
different leanings to react differently. Figure 3.2(b) shows the total number of high consensus and
low consensus news posted by the same 10 publishers, grouped into liberal, conservative, and neutral
categories. It also shows the total number of high consensus and low consensus news posted by all the
10 publishers. We can see that the total number of low consensus posts are considerably higher than the
total number of high consensus posts.
As we discuss later, low consensus posts have a much smaller chance of being received by users
with different political leanings, which leads to a more politically fragmented society. On the other hand,
high consensus posts have a better chance of spreading through communities with various political
leanings, and can be utilized to break the filter bubbles.
In this work, we make a case to promote high consensus posts in order to increase exposure to
ideologically cross-cutting content, which may help in lowering societal polarization.
3.2.2 Empirical study of consensus of news posts
Given that news posts with high consensus do exist, next we conduct an empirical study on consensus
of news posts on social media. Our main goal in this section is to understand if news posts with high
consensus are interesting to users (i.e., do they become popular), if they cover a wide range of topics,
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(a) Low consensus tweets (b) High consensus tweets
Figure 3.3: Topical coverage of low & high consensus tweets.
and if they expose users to relatively more cross-cutting content. We refer to the 100 news posts with
the highest consensus values in our ground truth Twitter dataset as high consensus news posts, and the
100 tweets with lowest consensus values as low consensus news posts.
To what extent do high and low consensus news posts become popular? To measure popularity, we
count the number of retweets for high and low consensus tweets. On average, high consensus tweets are
retweeted 158 times, whereas low consensus tweets are retweeted 177 times, i.e. slightly more often
but the numbers are very close. We observe a similar pattern when we compare the median number
of retweets of high consensus tweets (93) with low consensus tweets (89), indicating that both high
and low consensus tweets engage their readers to similar extents. This suggests that recommendation
systems which highlight high consensus tweets would feature content which is of similar popularity to
that generated by systems which highlight low consensus tweets.
Do high and low consensus news posts cover different topics? To verify whether high and low
consensus tweets cover similar (or very different) topics, we present the 100 most common words for
both sets of tweets in Figure 3.3. From the figure, it is evident that although both sets do cover popular
political topics (e.g., ‘Trump’, ‘Comey’, ‘FBI’ and other topics associated with FBI director James
Comey’s dismissal), high consensus tweets are topically more diverse and also contain posts on non-US
centric political topics (e.g., ‘North Korea’) and other more niche topics (e.g., ‘jobs’, ‘cyberattack’).
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Do high consensus posts lead to more exposure to ideologically cross-cutting content? To investi-
gate whether highlighting high consensus tweets leads to higher exposure to ideologically cross-cutting
contents, we examine whether the higher consensus tweets have relatively more retweets from the users
of opposite leaning (with respect to the publisher’s leaning), when compared to lower consensus tweets.
This analysis is motivated by the reasoning that as users of opposite leaning retweet the publisher’s
tweets, more opposite leaning users from these users’ neighborhoods would get exposed to them,
leading to higher exposure to cross-cutting content for users, and potentially lower polarized news
consumption on social media.
To validate whether our reasoning holds, we consider a particular tweet to have high cross-cutting
exposure if the number of opposite leaning retweeters for this tweet is higher than the baseline number
of opposite leaning retweeters of its publisher (computed as the average across 100 random tweets of
the publisher). When we rank the tweets by their consensus values and compare the top and bottom
10% tweets, we find that a much larger fraction (45%) of high consensus tweets have high cross-cutting
exposure than low consensus tweets (30%), indicating that high consensus tweets indeed lead to higher
exposure to cross-cutting content.
3.2.3 Identifying high and low consensus news posts on social media
After empirically exploring the consensus of social media news posts, we now turn our attention towards
automatically identifying high and low consensus news posts, which can scale up to cover a large
number of news publishers on Twitter. In this section, we first briefly discuss different features of social
media posts that have been applied in prior prediction and classification tasks. Then, we propose and
validate a novel class of audience leaning based features which are ideally suited for our consensus
identification task.
3.2.4 Features used in prior work
Prior works on classification and prediction tasks for social media posts have mostly used two broad
types of features: publisher based, and tweet based features. For instance, the political leaning of the
publisher has been used to quantify the tweet’s leaning [Kulshrestha et al., 2017], or the leaning of news
story URLs being shared by them on Facebook [Bakshy et al., 2015]. Others have used tweet based





Average number of retweets/replies/favorites
Political leaning, Language, Location
Tweet based Bag of words, Creation time
Number of retweets/replies/favorites
Table 3.2: Features used in prior work. The three most important features from each category are highlighted in
blue.
2010], or to quantify to what extent a tweet is interesting [Naveed et al., 2011]. Many other studies
have combined both publisher and tweet based features for various tasks including predicting future
retweets [Petrovic et al., 2011, Suh et al., 2010], and even predicting users’ personality traits [Golbeck
and Hansen, 2011]. Table 3.2 shows the features from each class which we are aware were used
previously.
3.2.5 Our proposed audience leaning based features
We propose a novel class of audience leaning based features, which to our knowledge have not
previously been used for predicting and classifying tweet properties. We use these features to identify
high and low consensus posts on Twitter.
For every tweet, there are three types of audience:
(i) Followers of the publisher of the tweet – they are the passive supporters of the post (on average 67%
of followers are of the same political leaning as the publisher5),
(ii) Retweeters of the tweet – they are more active supporters of the post (on average 78% of retweeters
are of the same leaning as the publisher), and
(iii) Repliers to the tweet – they are usually a mix of users supporting or opposing the news post (on
average 35% of repliers are of the opposite leaning to the publisher). In Table 3.3, we show a random
sample of replies from our Twitter dataset, and notice that many of them oppose either the news content
or the publisher.
We hypothesize that we can use the political leaning distributions of the three audiences of a post to
quantify whether different readers of a post are having similar reactions to it (i.e., to measure consensus).
To demonstrate our hypothesis, we select one high consensus and one low consensus post for which we
5Followers of famous politicians (e.g., President Trump) indeed include many users (such as journalists) from both ends
of the political spectrum, who may not necessarily support him or his views.
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@CNN You mean, like the UNFOUNDED claims of Russian col-
lusion? You people are typically selective in your bias pro?
https://t.co/CESkVpIZOk
@nytimes His actions were disgraceful. Being fired does not make him
a sympathetic figure. He affected the outcome? https://t.co/bIbiuj2CJJ
@BreitbartNews I just wonder, what motivates these libtards...
https://t.co/mzpBIKdPr4
@CNN hey fakenews do some homework, get out of office! Every illegal
that get a drivers license is registered to vote dem! I’d card, regs!
@AP Jews are so desperate to take over Syria that they will make up
anything.
Table 3.3: Random sample of replies for tweets in our dataset.
















(a) High consensus tweet













(b) Low consensus tweet
Figure 3.4: Distributions of political leanings of different audiences for the following news posts: (A) High con-
sensus: “Trump ordered emergency meeting after global cyber attack: official http://reut.rs/2r6Qkt8”
posted by Reuters, (B) Low consensus: “Michelle Obama criticizes Trump administration’s school
lunch policy http://cnn.it/2qckHwZ” posted by CNN .
computed consensus values using AMT workers’ judgments, and then computed the political leaning
distributions of the three audiences.
Inferring political leaning of Twitter users is a research challenge on its own, and beyond the
scope of this work. We adopt the methodology proposed in [Kulshrestha et al., 2017], which returns
the political leaning of a Twitter user in the range [−1.0, 1.0], with scores in [−1.0,−0.03) indicating
Republican leaning, [−0.03, 0.03] indicating neutral and (0.03, 1.0] indicating Democrat leaning. In
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 Distance bw PLD[Repliers] of tweet baseline
High Consensus tweets
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(c) χ2 Distance between PLD[Repliers] & publisher baseline
PLD[Repliers]
Figure 3.5: Distributions of χ2 distance between different audience political leaning distributions for 25% tweets
with highest and lowest consensus values.
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We can observe that there is a striking difference between the audience leaning distributions of
high and low consensus tweets in Figure 3.4. For the high consensus tweet, these distributions are
much more similar than for the low consensus tweet. More interestingly, retweeters typically being
supporters, have similar political leaning distribution as the followers of the publishers (for both types
of posts). However, for a lower consensus post, repliers being opposers, have a different distribution.
Therefore, we find that the degree of similarity of the leaning distributions of the audiences of the
post contains a useful signal to approximate the consensus for a post (i.e., the similarity in reaction of
readers of different leanings). We compute the χ2 distances between the leaning distributions of the
different audiences to capture their similarities. In Figure 3.5, we show the distribution of these χ2
values for high and low tweets. The difference in the distributions for the high and low consensus posts
give evidence for the discriminative power of these features.
Building upon these observations, we construct a number of audience leaning based features by
utilizing the political leanings of the three types of audiences of a tweet. Table 3.5 lists all such features,
which we use in this work.
3.2.6 Experimental evaluation
We first describe our experimental setup, then present our results for the aforementioned categories of
features.
Experimental setup: We use supervised learning approaches to identify whether a news tweet has
high consensus or low consensus using the features described in the previous section. For setting up the
classifiers, we first need a ground truth dataset of high and low consensus tweets. We use the consensus
values computed using AMT workers’ judgments for the Twitter dataset described previously and label
the top 25% consensus value tweets as high consensus, and bottom 25% tweets as low consensus tweets.
We use this set of 200 labeled tweets as our ground truth dataset.
Using the features described earlier, we apply four different types of supervised learning classifiers
for our task of tweet consensus classification: Linear SVM, Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression and
Random Forest classifiers. While using textual features of the tweets, we follow a two step approach as
described in [Chakraborty et al., 2016b, 2018]:
(i) first, we treat the textual features as bag-of-words and use Naive Bayes classifier to predict the class
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Classifier Different feature categoriesPublisher based (P) Tweet based (T) P and T Audience leaning based (A) P, T, and A
Logistic Regression 0.58 ±0.008 0.58 ±0.008 0.68 ±0.009 0.72 ±0.012 0.72 ±0.011
Linear SVM 0.58 ±0.008 0.58 ±0.008 0.68 ±0.009 0.72 ±0.012 0.72 ±0.011
Naive Bayes 0.59 ±0.007 0.57 ±0.015 0.60 ±0.01 0.66 ±0.015 0.66 ±0.012
Random Forest 0.58 ±0.008 0.57 ±0.01 0.64 ±0.01 0.67 ±0.015 0.67 ±0.017
Table 3.4: Average accuracies and 90% confidence intervals for different categories of features used for predicting
consensus of news tweets. Our proposed audience leaning based features perform best for this news
post consensus classification task.
using these textual features, and (ii) then we input these prediction outputs of Naive Bayes classifier as
features (along with our other features) to the different classifiers as the second step.
For training our classifiers, we use 5-fold cross-validation. In each test, the original sample is
partitioned into 5 sub-samples, out of which 4 are used as training data, and the remaining one is used
for testing the classifier. The process is then repeated 5 times, with each of the 5 sub-samples used
exactly once as the test data, thus producing 5 results. The entire 5-fold cross validation was then
repeated 20 times with different seeds used to shuffle the original dataset, thus producing 100 different
results. The results reported are averages of the 100 runs, along with the 90% confidence interval. Also,
we use feature ranking with recursive feature elimination that prunes out the insignificant features by
obtaining their importance from the supervised techniques.6
Experimental results: We successively implemented the different classifiers first using features from
each category separately, and then by combining the features from different categories. Accuracies
are shown in Table 3.4. We observe that the tweet based features have the worst performance. This
poor performance is most likely due to the short size of the tweets, which often means that there is
very little information in the tweet text and it is hard to understand them without also inspecting the
content of weblink, photograph or video included in the tweet. The performance of publisher based
features is better than that of tweet based features. The political leaning of the publisher is found to
be the most important feature for this category, and while it helps, it does not perfectly capture the
notion of consensus. When we combine publisher and tweet based features, there is improvement in
performance.
Next, we examine the performance of our proposed audience leaning based features and find it to
perform the best amongst the three categories of features. Digging deeper, we find that we correctly





Followers # Dem/Rep/Neu, Sum/Avg/Median/Skew of PL
Sum(PL) of Dem/Rep/Neu, PLD
Retweeters
# Dem/Rep/Neu, Sum/Avg/Med/Skew of PL
Sum(PL) of Dem/Rep/Neu, PLD of baseline
Avg #Dem/Rep/Neu in baseline, PLD
χ2 Distance bw PLD[Retweeters] of tweet & baseline
Repliers
# Dem/Rep/Neu, Sum/Avg/Med/Skew of PL
Sum(PL) of Dem/Rep/Neu, PLD of baseline
Avg #Dem/Rep/Neu in baseline, PLD
χ2 Distance bw PLD[Repliers] of tweet & baseline
Combination
χ2 Distance bw PLD[Repliers] and PLD[Retweeters]
χ2 Distance bw PLD[Repliers] and PLD[Followers]
χ2 Distance bw PLD[Retweeters] and PLD[Followers]
Table 3.5: Audience leaning based features. In the table, Dem, Rep, and Neu denote Democrat, Republican,
and Neutral respectively, PL denotes political leaning, and PLD denotes the distribution of political
leanings. Baselines are computed by taking average of PLD across all tweets. Most important features
are highlighted in blue.
the repliers’ and retweeters’ leaning distribution to be the most important feature, matching the intuition
we built earlier in the paper. In fact, even when we combine the three categories of features, we do not
find a performance gain over using the audience leaning based features alone. This is because when
we inspect the 10 most important features out of all the categories, the top 7 most important features
(highlighted in Table 3.5 in blue) are from our proposed category of audience leaning based features,
highlighting how well suited they are for our consensus identification task.
3.3 Promoting non-divisive news selectively to reach a divers audience
Highlighting high consensus news that elicits similar responses from both sides could act as a soothing
balm to help bring people together, despite initial ideological differences. As we discussed we
proposed such a complementary approach to increase diversity in users’ information consumption
by identifying high consensus, yet interesting information. Our system recommends high consensus
"purple" posts to both red (conservatives) and blue (liberals) users, hoping to increase users’ exposure
to cross-cutting news posts, leading to lower societal polarization and lower segregation in information
consumption [Chakraborty et al., 2017]. Nevertheless, it still remains unclear how such information is
spread across users in a network and how individuals choose to react to it. Here, we investigate users’
willingness to share and spread such posts, or the reach of high and low consensus news stories across
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a diverse audience. We also examine the newsworthiness [Galtung and Ruge, 1965, Weber, 2014] of
both high and low consensus news. Overall, we ask two fundamental questions on a Twitter network:
(1) Can high consensus posts help to break filter bubbles (and thus potentially decrease polarization in
society)? (2) Can we propose methods to propagate high consensus stories broadly across society? We
highlight the following contributions:
I. We compile a novel dataset, which reveals how Twitter users with similar or different political
leanings are connected to each other. To do so, we consider a dataset of 400 news tweets posted
by 10 publishers containing 80 high and 80 low consensus posts [Babaei et al., 2018]. For every
high or low consensus news post, we collected a subset of its 100 random retweeters and for each
retweeter we collected a random set of their 100 followers. We compute the political leaning of
the 1,616,000 users who either retweeted a high or low consensus news story or were exposed to
it. Moreover, to simulate the spread of news in Twitter, we crawl a network of more than 100
million Twitter users. This allows us to compute the political leanings of 69,687 users connected
by 2,907,026 links.
II. Using our dataset, we study how individuals with different political leanings get exposed to
and retweet high and low consensus news posted by users from various political perspectives.
We observe that low consensus news tends to proliferate primarily only amongst users with a
particular political learning. In contrast, high consensus news has a higher chance of spreading
through the entire network. Importantly, high consensus news posted by a set of neutral publishers
spreads more equally across liberal and conservative users than if posted by the same number of
a mix of non-neutral publishers.
III. Based on the above observations, we propose a strategy that seeds neutral publishers to expose
roughly equal fractions of people with different political leaning to high consensus news with the
minimum cost (hoping this may help to break filter bubbles which can trap users). We show that
our proposed strategy is more effective than seeding the most influential nodes without taking the
political leanings into account.
Our work provides new insights and a complementary tool which may help to reduce filter bubbles,
encourage healthier interaction between population subgroups, and lead to a more cohesive society.
60
3.4 Dataset
Here, we consider the dataset of 400 news tweets posted by 10 publishers that we discussed earlier. The
dataset contains 80 low and 80 high consensus news posts.
To obtain the political leanings of the users who either retweeted a high or low consensus news or
were exposed to it, for every high or low consensus news post in the dataset, we collected a random set
of its 100 retweeters. Then for each retweeter, we collected a random set of his 100 followers. Finally,
for each of these 1,616,000 users we collected their followees to compute their political leaning.
As we discuss later, low consensus posts have a much smaller chance of being received by users
with different political leanings, which leads to a more politically fragmented society. On the other hand,
high consensus posts have a better chance of spreading through communities with various political
leanings, and can be utilized to break the filter bubbles.
3.4.1 Collecting users’ political leanings
For every news in our set of 80 high and 80 low consensus news posts, we collected a random set of its
100 retweeters. Then for each retweeter, we collected a random set of its 100 followers. Thus we have
1,616,000 twitter users.
We then inferred every user’s political leaning, as a score between -1, +1, using the method of
[Kulshrestha et al., 2017], where we discussed earlier 3.1.2.
For retweeters with certain political leaning, we calculated the expected fraction of their liberal,
conservative, and neutral followers, as is shown in Table 3.6.
Liberal Conservative Neutral
Liberal 0.76 0.04 0.2
Conservative 0.045 0.85 0.1
Neutral 0.3 0.27 0.43
Table 3.6: Expected fraction of liberal, conservative, and neutral followers of retweeters with various political
leanings. Rows and columns correspond to retweeters and followers.
We also estimated the conditional probability that users with different political leanings retweet
high consensus and low consensus news post from liberal, conservative, and neutral publishers (given
that they retweet) in Table 3.7. It can be seen that users with a certain political leaning retweet low
consensus posts from the publishers with the same political leaning with a very high probability.
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Interestingly, users retweet high consensus news posts from the publishers with the same political
leaning with a smaller probability. On the other hand, there is a very small chance that users with
a certain political leaning retweet low consensus posts from the publishers with different political

























Table 3.7: Conditional probability of retweeting a high and low consensus news post (indicated H and L in the
table) by users from various political leanings (given that they retweet). Rows and columns correspond
to publishers and retweeters. For instance, in the first cell (first row and column), the probability that
liberal users retweet high/low consensus news posts published by liberals publishers is 0.65/0.85.
3.5 The Gap between proliferation of high and low consensus news
In this section, we investigate how high and low consensus news posts spread among users with various
political leanings in Twitter. In particular, our goal is to answer the following key questions:
How do individuals with certain political leaning (liberal, conservative, and neutral) get exposed to
high and low consensus news posts?
Studying the above key question allows us to understand the gap between proliferation of high
and low consensus news, and develop strategies to decrease the polarization in the society by breaking
the filter bubbles that trap users. We start by investigating users’ behavior in retweeting high and low
consensus news posts. Then, we discuss how the confirmation bias in retweeting behavior makes the
filter bubbles grow larger and promote social polarization.
3.5.1 Confirmation bias in retweeting behavior
First, we study how users with different political leaning share high and low consensus news post.
Specifically, we compare how users with different political leanings retweet low and high consensus
news posts from publishers with different political perspectives.
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of retweeters’ political leanings for low and high consensus news posted by publishers
with different political perspectives. Distribution of political leanings for a random high and a random
low consensus news posted by (a) liberal, (c) conservative, and (e) neutral publishers. Distribution of
average political leanings for 100 high and low consensus news posted by (b) liberal, (d) conservative,
and (f) neutral publishers. Distribution of political leanings for high consensus news (purple) is more
symmetric and centered around 0.
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Figures 3.6(a), 3.6(c), 3.6(e) show the distribution of the political leanings of all retweeters for
one random low consensus and one random high consensus news posted by CNN (liberal publisher),
FoxNews (conservative publisher), and Reuters (neutral publisher)7. Notice that the distribution of
retweeters’ political leanings in Figure 3.6(a), 3.6(e) has more density in the right (liberal leaning) for
the low consensus news. On the other hand, the distribution of retweeters’ political leanings in Figure
3.6(c) has considerably more density in the left (conservative leaning) for the low consensus news.
Importantly, the distribution of retweeters’ political leanings for high consensus news (purple curve) is
more symmetric in all the Figures. Moreover, the mean of the distribution for high consensus news is
close to 0.
Next, we consider 80 low consensus and 80 high consensus news posted by the 10 publishers,
ranging from liberals to neutrals to conservatives: Slate, Salon, New York Times, CNN, AP, Reuters,
Politico, Fox News, Drudge Report, and Breitbart News. For each news post, we consider a set of its 100
retweeters chosen at random. Figures 3.6(b), 3.6(d), 3.6(f) show the distribution of the expected political
leanings of retweeters of all the low consensus and high consensus news posted by liberal, conservative,
and neutral publishers, respectively. Again, the distribution of retweeters’ political leanings for high
consensus news (purple curve) is more symmetric, and is centered around 0 in all the Figures. In
particular, the distribution of retweeters’ political leanings for high consensus news posted by neutral
publishers has the most symmetric shape around 0.
We summarize our key observations as follows:
• I. Low consensus news posted by publishers with a specific political leaning (liberal/conservative)
are mostly retweeted by users with similar political leanings (Figures 3.6(b), 3.6(d)).
• II. High consensus news posted by publishers with a specific political leaning (liberal/conserva-
tive) are retweeted by users with various political leanings (liberal/conservative/neutral) (Figures
3.6(b), 3.6(d)).
• III. While low and high consensus news posted by neutral publishers spread with lower disparity
among users with different political leanings, high consensus news posted by neutral publishers
have the highest probability to be spread with minimum disparity among users (Figure 3.6(f)).
7The PDFs have been empirically estimated using kernel density estimation [Bowman and Azzalini, 2004]
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of political leanings for (a) followers of liberal, conservative, and neutral publishers,
and (b) followers of retweeters of liberal, conservative, and neutral publishers. As we get farther
away from the publishers, the distribution of liberal and conservative followers becomes significantly
more skewed (filter bubbles grow larger).
3.5.2 The growth of filter bubbles in twitter
Next, we investigate how individuals with different political leanings get exposed to high and low
consensus news posted by liberal, conservative, and neutral publishers.
Figure 3.7(a) depicts the distribution of political leanings for followers (level 1) of liberal, conser-
vative, and neutral publishers. We observe that users with conservative or liberal leanings are mostly
exposed to news posted by publishers with the same political leaning (the bubble effect). Therefore,
the distribution of political leaning for followers of liberal and conservative publishers are skewed to
the left and right, respectively. Nevertheless, followers of conservative publishers has a more skewed
distribution. This is resulted from the fact that the conservative community is denser, and has fewer
connections to liberals and neutrals in Twitter (c.f. Table 3.6). On the other hand, the distribution of
political leanings for neutral users is very symmetric and is centered at 0. Hence, neutral users get
similar exposure to liberal and conservative view points.
Figure 3.7(b) shows the distribution of political leanings for followers of retweeters (level 2)
of liberal, conservative, and neutral publishers. We observe that while the distribution of political
leanings for followers of retweeters of neutral publishers is symmetric and centered around 0, the
distribution of political leanings for followers of retweeters of liberal or conservative publishers are
extremely skewed. As expected, followers of retweeters of conservative publishers have a more skewed
distribution. Interestingly, the skewness of the distributions for followers of retweeters (level 2) is much
larger compared to the skewness of distributions for followers of publishers (level 1). This means that
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filter bubbles in level 2 are larger than those in level 1. Our experiments show that as we get farther
away from the publishers, filter bubbles grow even larger (Figure 3.12).
We summarize our key observations as follows:
• I. Conservatives and liberals get a biased exposure to the news posted in Twitter, while neutrals
get similar exposure to liberal and conservative view points (Figure 3.7(a)).
• II. Users who get the news from retweeters get a significantly more biased exposure, compare to
users who get the news from publishers. In other words, as we get farther away from the news
publishers, the filter bubbles grow larger (Figure 3.7(b)).
3.5.3 Breaking filter bubbles
To break filter bubbles, we aim for all individuals to get similar exposure to news stories. Our proposed
strategy to break the bubble effect is based on the three key observations discussed earlier: (1) while low
consensus news are more likely to proliferate amongst the users with a particular political leaning, high
consensus news has a much higher chance of spreading among users with different political leanings;
(2) high consensus news posted by neutral publishers has the lowest disparity for spreading among
liberal and conservative users; and (3) as users get farther away from publishers, they get a more biased
exposure to news. Based on the above observations, we conjecture:
High consensus news posted by neutral users help break the filter bubbles.
High consensus news posted by neutral users achieve high spread with little disparity regarding
political leaning. We confirm our conjecture and show the effectiveness of our proposed strategy
through an extensive set of experiments later in the paper.
In the following section, we first formulate the problem of information diffusion in social networks.
Then, we discuss the problem of finding a near-optimal set of neutral users to seed spreading high
consensus news and break the filter bubbles.
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3.6 Problem formulation: Information diffusion
We start by formulating the information diffusion problem to model the spread of news among indi-
viduals with various political leanings in Twitter. We simulate the proliferation of news by assuming
that each user can be a publisher. Then we select a set of users and involve them to post news. We
represent Twitter by a directed graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of
directed edges between the nodes. The nodes in the network are partitioned into three disjoint groups
V = {Vd,Vr,Vn}, where Vd,Vr,Vn represent users with liberal, conservative, and neutral leanings,
respectively. A directed edge (v, u) exists if user v follows user u. When users post tweets, their
followers can retweet and spread the tweets in the network. To model spread of information, e.g.
news or tweets in Twitter, two well-known classical diffusion models are introduced in the literature
[Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001]: (1) Independent Cascade model (IC) and (2) Linear Threshold
(LT) model. In this work, we consider the IC model (section 3.1.5).
3.6.1 Information diffusion with low disparity
Our goal is to find the smallest seed set of users that when post a tweet, it spreads through at least a
fraction Qp ∈ [0, 1] of liberals (Vl), conservatives (Vc), and neutrals (Vn) in Twitter, where p ∈ {l, c, n}.
We formulate the problem as follows:
min
S⊆V











where fl(.), fc(.), fn(.) determine the total number users among liberals (Vl), conservatives (Vc), and
neutrals (Vn) that are activated as a result of selecting the seed set S. We call Vp “saturated" by S when
min
(
fp(S), Qp · |Vp|
)
=Qp · |Vp|. When a certain fraction Qp of individuals with a particular political
leaning p are exposed to a news (activated), any new activated individual with political leaning p cannot
further improve the utility. This will give individuals with different political leanings a higher chance of
being exposed to the news.
We note that the utility function, i.e., fp : 2Vp → Z+, is a non-negative, monotone, submodular set
function [Kempe et al., 2003]. The submodularity is an intuitive notion of diminishing returns, stating
67
that for any sets A ⊆ A′ ⊆ V and any node a ∈ V \A′, it holds that:
f(A ∪ {a})− f(A) ≥ f(A′ ∪ {a})− f(A′).
Although problem (3.3) is NP-hard in general [Wolsey, 1982], for maximizing a submodular
function the following greedy algorithm provides a logarithmic approximation guarantee. The greedy
algorithm starts from an empty set, add a new node to the set which provides the maximal marginal
gain in terms of utility, and stops whenever the desired Qp fraction of individuals with political leaning
p are activated.
3.6.2 Spreading through neutrals to break the bubbles
In Problem (3.3), the fraction Qp can be arbitrary for individuals with different political leanings.
However, to break the filter bubbles we wish individuals with different political leanings to get a similar
exposure to various news. In other works, we assume similar values for Ql, Qc, Qn. Moreover, the
news posted by individuals with neutral leanings have a higher chance of spreading among individuals
with liberal and conservative political leanings. Therefore, to break the filter bubbles we aim at finding
the smallest subset S ⊆ Vn that when post a news, at least a fraction Qp of individuals with political
leaning p get exposed to the news. Formally, we have
min
S⊆Vn












In this section we investigate the effect of spreading high consensus news posted by neutral users among
individuals with conservative, liberal, and neutral leanings in Twitter. In particular, we show that our
proposed strategy is very effective in spreading information among individuals with various political
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Figure 3.8: The sample graph from the real Twitter data set collected in 2009. Blue, red, and green nodes
indicate users with liberal, conservative, and neutral political leanings.
leanings and lowering societal polarization for news consumption. We first describe our instance of
Twitter network. We then explain our experimental setup, and present our findings.
Twitter network. Our network is collected from Twitter in September 2009 [Babaei et al., 2016, Cha
et al., 2010], and includes: 52 million user profiles, 1.9 billion directed follow links among the users,
and 1.7 billion public tweets posted by the users. In order to obtain a static network, we consider the
tweets published on July 1, 2009, and filter out users that did not tweet before July 1. After this filtering,
we have 70,000 active users. We then extract the strongest connected community, including 69,687
users and 2,907,026 link between them, yielding 19162, 3449, 47076 nodes with liberal, conservative,
and neutral leanings, respectively. The average degree of network is 41.5. Figure 3.8 shows an induced
random sample from our final Twitter network.
Sampled Twitter network. We also created a smaller network by sampling 10% of nodes uniformly
at random from our original Twitter network, and connecting the users if they have a connection in the
original network. The strongest connected community includes 3,753 users and 6,993 connections with
average degree of 1.83. Our sampled Twitter network includes 812 liberals, 186 conservatives, and
2,755 neutrals. Note that the structure of the original Twitter network is very different than the sampled
Twitter network. In particular, the sampled Twitter network is significantly sparser than the original
Twitter network.
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Seeds selection from all nodes
Seeds selection from neutral nodes
(e)

























Seeds selection from all nodes
Seeds selection from neutral nodes
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Seeds selection from all nodes
Seeds selection from neutral nodes
(g)













Seeds selection from all nodes
Seeds selection from neutral nodes
(h)
Figure 3.9: Fraction of individuals with liberal, conservative, and neutral political leanings who are exposed to a
high consensus news. Left column shows the result on our Twitter network, and the right column
shows the result on the smaller sampled Twitter network. (a), (b) show the fraction of exposed
individuals when the seeds are selected from the entire network by solving Problem (3.3). (c), (d)
show the fraction of exposed individuals when the seeds are selected from neutral users by solving
Problem (3.4). (e), (f) compare the fraction of exposed individuals when the initial seed is selected
from the entire network vs. neutrals. (g), (b) compare the disparity of diffusion when the initial seed
set is selected from the entire network vs. neutrals.
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Experimental setup. For a pair of users u ∈ Vi and w ∈ Vj , we calculate the success probability of
activation puw as the expected fraction of users with political leaning j who retweeted news posted by
users with political leaning i. The retweeting probabilities are listed in Table 3.7.
We apply the greedy algorithm to find a near optimal subset of users that can spread a news over
a certain fraction Ql = Qc = Qn = 0.1 of liberals (Vl), conservatives (Vc), and neutrals (Vn) in the
Twitter network. To evaluate the utility function fp(.) in Problem 3.3 and Problem 3.4, we estimate
it by using Monte Carlo sampling [Hastings, 1970]. We used 200 samples for this estimation, which
yielded a stable estimation of the utility function.
Note that using equal values for Ql, Qc, Qn in Problem (3.3), we retrieve the fair influence
maximization formulation proposed by [Ali et al., 2019a]. In our experiments, we compare our
proposed strategy to fair influence maximization.
3.7.1 Neutrals can break filter bubbles
In our first set of experiments, we apply the greedy algorithm to Problem (3.3) and Problem (3.4) to
find the initial set of users to spread news in Twitter. Figure 3.9 compares the fraction of individuals
with liberal, conservative, and neutral political leanings who got exposed to a high consensus news
spread through an initial seed set obtained by solving Problem (3.3) vs. Problem (3.4). The goal is
to expose Qp = 10% of individuals with liberal, conservative, and neutral leanings to the news. The
top row shows the result on our original Twitter network, and the bottom row shows the result on the
smaller sampled Twitter network. Note that the sampled network is much sparser than the original
Twitter network.
Figures 3.9(a), 3.9(b) show the fraction of exposed individuals when the seeds are selected from the
entire network by solving Problem (3.3). Figures 3.9(c), 3.9(d) show the fraction of exposed individuals
when the seeds are selected from the users with neutral leanings by solving Problem (3.4). We note that
as more individuals are added to the initial seed set by the greedy algorithm, the disparity in the number
of exposed users with different political leanings is much smaller in Figures 3.9(c), 3.9(d) compared to
Figures 3.9(a), 3.9(b). This clearly confirms the effectiveness of our proposed strategy in breaking the
filter bubbles.
We note that if we do not take into account the different pattern of diffusion among users of various
political leanings, the neutral users may not be the ones that can maximize the spread of information.
71























(a) Seeds with various leanings























(b) Seeds with neutral leanings
Figure 3.10: Fraction of users who were exposed to a high-consensus news story, when all users propagate the
news with the same probability of 0.1, irrespective of their political leanings in Twitter. (a) shows
the result when seeds are selected from the entire network, (b) shows the result when seed are
selected only from the neutral users.
Figure 3.10(a), 3.10(b) compare the fraction of users who were exposed to a high-consensus news,
when the seeds are selected from the entire network vs. only the neural users. Here, we assume that all
the users spread the news with the same probability of 0.1 irrespective of their political leanings. We
see that the news posted by neutral publishers have more disparity and reaches a smaller number of
users.
3.7.2 Neutrals can widely spread the news
Figures 3.9(e), 3.9(f) compare the fraction of exposed individuals when the initial seed is selected from
the entire network vs. neutrals. There are two interesting observations: the initial seeds selected from
neutral users can spread the news even more than users selected from the entire network. Moreover, as
we continue the selection process, selected neutral seeds can spread the news as well as the seed set
selected from the entire network. This interesting observation confirms the power of neutral users in
spreading news in Twitter. As Table 3.8 depicts, the average number of retweeting of a tweet posted by
liberal, conservative, and neutrals are almost equal. There is a interesting observation. High consensus
tweets posted by neutrals are retweeted with many democrats and republicans in addition to neutrals.
Interestingly, news posted by neutrals is retweeted by an even larger number of users compared to news
posted by liberal or conservative publishers.
Figure 3.11(a) shows the number of users selected with liberal, conservative, and neutral leanings
for varying number of seeds selected greedily to solve Problem (3.3). Figure 3.11(a) shows the result
on the Twitter network, and Figure 3.11(b) shows the result on the sampled Twitter network. We see
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Table 3.8: Average number of retweeting a high and low consensus news post (indicated H and L in the table) by
users from various political leanings. Rows and columns correspond to publishers and retweeters.
For instance, in the first cell (first row and column), liberal users on average retweets high/low
consensus news posts published by liberals publishers 76 times. We note that news posted by neutrals
is retweeted by an even larger number of users, compared to news posted by liberal or conservative
publishers.
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(b) Sampled Twitter network
Figure 3.11: Number of users selected with liberal, conservative, and neutral leanings for varying number of
seeds selected greedily to solve Problem (3.3). Figure shows the results on (a) the Twitter network,
and (b) the smaller sampled Twitter network.
that in the set of seeds greedily selected from the entire network, the majority of the users have neutral
leanings. This further shows that neutral users are highly effective in spreading information in Twitter.
This is consistent with our initial observation, that the news posted by neutrals has a higher probability
of spreading among users with different political leanings.
3.7.3 Neutrals spread news with low disparity
Figures 3.9(g), 3.9(h) compare the total disparity of diffusion when the initial seed set is selected from
the entire network vs. neutrals. We define the total disparity as the sum of all disparity (differences)

















We observe that the total disparity is much smaller when the initial seed set is selected from users with
neutral political leanings (Problem (3.3)) compared to the case when the initial seed set is selected
from the entire network (Problem (3.4)). The difference is larger when the size of the initial seed set is
smaller.
3.7.4 Filter bubbles grow larger over time
Figure 3.12 shows the fraction of individuals with various political leanings who got exposed to a
high consensus news during the diffusion process (IC), for varying number of seeds. More precisely,
for a given seed set information diffusion proceeds in discrete time steps t = {0, 1, 2, . . . , }. Figure
3.12 compares the fraction of users with various political leanings who received the news in the first
time-step, t = 1, and second time-step t = 2 in our original Twitter network. Figure 3.12(a) shows the
result when the seeds are selected from the entire network, by solving Problem (3.3). Figure 3.12(b)
shows the result when the seeds are selected from the users with neutral political leanings, by solving
Problem (3.4). It can be seen that when seeds are selected from the entire network, the disparity
becomes larger as the diffusion process continues. On the other hand, the disparity is much smaller
when seeds are selected from neutral users.
The above result confirms our observation that the filter bubbles grow larger as the diffusion
continues over time. In other words, when the seeds are selected from the entire network, as the we get
farther away from the initial set of seeds, the disparity in the number of users with different political
leanings who are exposed to the news becomes larger. On the other hand, when diffusion is originated
from neutral seeds, users with different political leanings get exposed to the information at the same
time. This is crucial while spreading time-critical information, such as health-related information or
emergency warnings, in the network.
3.8 Discussion
Since we propose increasing exposure to high consensus news, we would like to check that such stories
carry important information for public discourse. Babaei et al. [2018] compared low and high consensus
posts on social media by empirically analyzing their properties. They showed that both types of posts
are equally popular and cover similar topics. We checked this by analyzing 400 randomly selected posts
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Figure 3.12: Fraction of users who are exposed to the news from different groups in first and second time step
of propagation process in the Twitter network. (a) Shows the result when seed are selected from
the entire network (Problem 3.3), (b) shows the result when seed are selected from neutral users
(Problem 3.4).
including examples of high and low consensus news, along with their sources, number of retweets,
replies, and likes. See Table 3.9 for details. We highlight the following observations:
I. For both types of news posts, a variety of news sources exists across the ideological spectrum.
Figure 3.2 also shows several publishers with different political leaning that posts both types of
high and low consensus news.
II. On average, high and low consensus tweets are retweeted 158 and 177 times respectively. On
average high consensus tweets are liked 532 times, whereas, low consensus news are liked 488
times. Thus, high and low consensus news stories have similar popularity.
III. Galtung and Ruge [1965] introduce newsworthiness theory in which they propose several news
factors such as frequency, meaningfulness, continuity, etc. Eilders [2006] showed that these
factors impact news’ worthiness. Weber [2014] proposes the following hypothesis: “The news
factors of a news item influence the level of participation in commenting in an article’s comments
section”. Weber also noted several other factors, such as having a high social impact or being
controversial, that may attract more comments as participation [Weber, 2012]. Weber emphasized
that if a news story attracts more comments, then it has higher worthiness. Here we can consider
the number of replies as participating comments. On average, high consensus and low consensus
news stories received 100 and 114 replies (comments), respectively, suggesting that both types of
news have similar worthiness.
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In summary, we observe that high and low consensus news are similar along multiple dimensions,
including variety of news source, popularity, topic covering, and worthiness.
3.9 Summary
To summarize, we propse an approach to inject diversity in users’ consumption by defining and
operationalizing the concept of consensus of news posts in terms of general agreement in readers’
reaction, irrespective of their own political leanings. We then use human judgments to generate a
ground truth dataset of non-divisinve (high consensus) and divisive (low consensus) news posts on
social media, and observe that a substantial amount of high consensus purple posts are posted by news
publishers on social media (perhaps surprisingly, even by politically extreme publishers).
We also find that both types of tweets are equally popular with users (i.e., garner similar number of
retweets) and also cover similar topics. Further, we observe that high consensus purple posts tend to
provide more cross-cutting exposure to views than low consensus posts. To identify high consensus
purple news posts automatically, we propose a novel class of features of social media posts on Twitter,
which we term audience leaning based features. These features describe the distribution of the political
leanings of audience subgroups interacting with a post – namely the retweeters and repliers of a post.
Intuitively, retweeters are more likely to be supportive of it, while repliers have a higher likelihood
of opposing it. Additionally, the followers of the publisher of the post also form a passive audience
subgroup for the post. We use these audience leanings as features to capture the degree of consensus
that a social media post is likely to have. We present an evaluation showing that our proposed features
are well suited to help identify high and low consensus tweets automatically with high accuracy, leading
to significantly better performance than can be achieved using previously proposed publisher based and
content based features.
We then propose and quantify the benefits of a potential strategy to spread high consensus news
across readers with diverse political leanings. We first compile a dataset and make the following
three key observations: (1) low consensus news is more likely to remain within subgroups of users
with similar political leanings, whereas high consensus news spreads more across subgroups; (2) high
consensus news posted by neutral publishers spreads more equally across subgroups; and (3) users that
get the information from other users instead of the publishers, get an even more biased exposure to
76
High Consensus News Low Consensus News
BREAKING: Senate intelligence committee invites fired FBI Director
Comey to appear in closed session next Tuesday .
Source: AP, 2.7K Retweets, 176 Replies, 5k Likes
Report: Trump "revealed more information to the Russian
ambassador than we have shared with our own allies"
Source: Salon, 51 Retweets, 14 Replies, 34 Likes.
@johnrobertsFox on firing of James Comey: "This came as a shock
to literally everyone, including the @FBI Director." #TheFive
Source: Fox News, 156 Retweets, 259 Replies, 574 Likes.
Orrin Hatch makes clear the conservative case against Obamacare:
Once the public "is on the dole, they’ll take eve..
Source: Salon, 113 Retweets, 12 Replies, 10 Likes.
White House calls emergency meetings as global cyberattack spreads
http://politi.co/2qgNnW1
Source: Politico, 80 Retweets, 31 Replies, 72 Likes.
Why are Republicans attacking the Census Bureau? Because they
don’t want an accurate count of Americans
Source: Salon, 691 Retweets, 22 Replies, 680 Likes.
The Latest: US says Russia should be worried about N. Korea missile
launch; Japan, US, South Korea discuss threat.
http://apne.ws/2r5iNQ1
Source: AP, 167 Retweets, 12 Replies, 93 Likes.
Is Donald Trump the "little boy President"? A @CNNOpinion
contributor takes a closer look at his latest moves
http://cnn.it/2pE1Uaq
Source: CNN, 179 Retwees, 264 Replies, 468 Likes.
White House wants the FBI to complete its investigation into Russia
interference in the 2016 election.
http://apne.ws/2qso0kS
Source: AP, 179 Retweets, 68 Replies, 97 Likes.
@SarahHuckabee: "@POTUS over the last several months lost
confidence in Director Comey. The DOJ lost confidence in Director
Comey."
Source: Fox News, 122 Retweets, 94 Replies, 593 Likes.
Donald Trump’s lawyers say he doesn’t have any Russian money
"with a few exceptions" http://dlvr.it/P7QvTv
Source: Salon, 125 Retweets, 10 Replies, 18 Likes.
Schieffer Slams Trump: Comey Firing Reminds Me of
JFK-Oswald Conspiracies
Source: Fox News, 55 Retweets, 510 Replies, 149 Likes.
North Korea’s Sunday missile test is what one researcher is calling an
"extended middle finger to Trump"
Source: CNN, 212 Retweets, 63 Replies, 326 Likes.
Sarah Huckabee Sanders went on Fox last night and, wait for it, said
it’s "time to move on" from Russia probe:
http://slate.me/2qsCqBO
Source: Slate, 28 Retweets, 35 Replies, 48 Likes.
"He knows the last three days have not been good for him":
Sean Spicer’s make-or-break briefing
http://politi.co/2r1t8MQ
Source: Politico, 59 Retweets, 37 Replies, 112 Likes.
"A fresh start will serve the FBI": Republicans provide cover
for Donald Trump
http://ift.tt/2q6C1BM
Source: Salon, 107 Retweets, 61 Replies, 88 Likes.
San Diego police: Teen shot and killed left suicide note
http://fxn.ws/2ps2UPO #FOXNewsUS
Source: Fox News, 52 Retweets, 21 Replies, 84 Likes.
Acting FBI Director contradicts White House claim that fired
director James Comey had lost support.
http://apne.ws/2r5GJjr
Source: AP, 357 Retweets, 56 Replies, 497 Likes.
@HillaryClinton launches Onward Together PAC. Read more:
http://fxn.ws/2qlcwz0
Source: Fox News, 144 Retweets, 574 Replies, 94 Likes.
Democrats are now openly talking about impeaching Donald Trump
Source: Salon, 105 Retweets, 22 Replies, 153 Likes.
Sources: James Comey told lawmakers he wanted more resources
for Russia probe http://politi.co/2r2Hxpf
Source: Politico, 132 Retweets, 40 Replies, 204 Likes.
It appears that Trump may have just falsely accused himself of
wiretapping himself: http://slate.me/2r9agb8
Source: Slate, 198 Retweets, 25 Replies, 303 Likes.
Trump says ‘his decision’ to fire FBI chief, calls him ’showboat’:
NBC interview http://reut.rs/2r6gUjg
Source: Reuters, 69 Retweets, 62 Replies, 83 Likes.
What all the Russia investigations have done and what could
happen next
Source: The New York Times, 131 Retweets, 52 Replies, 226 Likes.
Condoleezza Rice: ’When you’re not credible about Syria,
you’re not credible about North Korea’
http://fxn.ws/2pudYMd
Source: Fox News, 288 Retweets, 80 Replies, 806 Likes.
Republicans are allowing states to drug test people applying for
unemployment benefits
Source: Salon, 19 Retweets, 10 Replies, 16 Likes.
Senior US official says Trump administration has approved
weapons for Kurds.
http://apne.ws/2qYRLac
Source: AP, 180 Retweets, 45 Replies, 97 Likes.
VP Mike Pence defends firing of FBI Director James Comey,
says Trump ‘made the right decision at the right time.’
http://apne.ws/2q3fl7Q
Source: AP, 65 Retweets, 83 Replies, 76 Likes.
When men and women finish school and start working, they’re
paid pretty much equally. But then it all changes.
Source: The New York Times, 854 Retweets, 120 Replies, 1.1K likes.
Pres. Trump’s firing of FBI Director James Comey is a
"grotesque abuse of power," legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin says
http://cnn.it/2q1FQd4
Source: CNN, 803 Retweets, 169 Replies, 1.3 Likes.
Table 3.9: Examples of high and low consensus news including the source, number of retweets, replies and likes.
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news. Then, we propose a strategy that spreads high consensus news through neutral publishers, and
quantify the significant decrease in the disparity of users’ news exposure. Our extensive experiments on
Twitter shows that seeding high consensus information with neutral publishers is an effective way to
achieve high spread with little disparity regarding political leaning.
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CHAPTER 4
Analyzing biases in perception of truth in news
stories and their implications for fact checking
4.1 Introduction
Technologists, policymakers, and media watchdog groups are criticizing social media sites like Facebook
and Twitter for allowing misinformation to spread unchecked on their platforms [Barrabi, 2018].
Recently, the ‘PizzaGate’ conspiracy theory has seen anew on teen-loved TikTok app [Ovide, 2020].
The spread of such “fake news” has been linked to foreign meddling in political elections [Allcott
and Gentzkow, 2017], riots [Taub and Fisher, 2018], mass displacement, and even loss of human
lives [Hogan and Safi, 2018]. Studies have proposed methods and tools to automatically detect fake
news [Grinberg et al., 2019, Guess et al., 2019], for example, by identifying linguistic features employed
by fake news creators [Shu et al., 2017, Chopra et al., 2017, Zhao et al., 2015, Bourgonje et al., 2017,
Chakraborty et al., 2016b, Bhatt et al., 2017, Kumar et al., 2016], by analyzing the propagation patterns
of such news in social media [Qazvinian et al., 2011, Ruchansky et al., 2017, Kwon et al., 2017, Kim
et al., 2017, Oh et al., 2013, Vicario et al., 2019], or by checking new content against a database of
known fake and real news [Ciampaglia et al., 2015, Kumar et al., 2017, Ruchansky et al., 2017]. Could
we try to keep 3 refs at max per sentence?
Until reliant fully automated detection mechanisms for online misinformation arrive, social media
platforms at large will remain dependent on human supervision to understand the news context [Graves,
2018]. Many platforms rely on crowdsourced reports as well as dedicated fact-checking outlets1 like
Snopes, PolitiFact, FullFact, and FactCheck [Lyons, 2018]. Stories deemed false by the fact-checkers
1https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536
who follow principled methods such as Poynter’s Code of Principles2 and then ranked lower in users’
news feeds or timelines, significantly limiting their future views [Lyons, 2018].
Fact checking by human experts is a highly resource-constrained process: it is not possible to fact
check every news story circulated on social media. Thus, platform providers need to prioritize stories
for fact checking. The most pertinent question that emerges in this context is how should the platform
prioritize ‘check-worthy’ news stories? Social media sites currently encourage users to report any news
they encounter on the platform they perceive to be fake. Stories reported as fake by numerous people
are then prioritized for fact checking. In essence, to counter the proliferation of fake news, social media
platforms are relying on their users’ perceptions of the truthfulness of news to prioritize stories for fact
checking.
Despite this reliance on user perceptions, no prior study has focused on understanding how the
crowd perceives truth in news stories, and how these perceptions affect the detection and possible
correction of online falsehoods. In this work, we perform the first in-depth analysis of users’ truth
perceptions of news stories – rather than news outlets [Pennycook and Rand, 2019] – by designing and
validating a novel truth perception test. Using this test, we solicit users’ truth perceptions for 150 stories
that have already been fact checked, allowing us to compare users’ perceptions to a known ground truth
level determined by fact checkers.
Our comparison of users’ perceptions of truth and actual ground truth reveals several discrepancies.
To illustrate them, consider the following six stories:
(S1) Jared Kushner registered to vote as a woman in New York — Fact-checked as False
(S2) Betsy DeVos and her family contributed millions of dollars to the campaigns of Republican
candidates — Fact-checked as True
(S3) Attorney General Jeff Sessions has investments in the private prison industry — Fact-checked as
Mostly False
(S4) A video shows Bill Clinton saying that his wife Hillary Clinton ‘communed’ with the spirit of
Eleanor Roosevelt — Fact-checked as Mostly True
(S5) A U.S. surgeon who exposed “Clinton Foundation corruption in Haiti” was found dead in his home
under suspicious circumstances — Fact-checked as False
2https://www.poynter.org/international-fact-checking-network-fact-checkers-code-principles
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Many Shades of Perceptions of Truth
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 Figure 4.1: Ground truth and perceived truth levels for six different news stories. Here, ground truth level (shown
as orange triangles on x-axis) of each news story is obtained from Snopes, and the perceived truth
levels are inferred by gathering the truth perceptions of 100 surveyed users.
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(S6) President Trump’s administration shut down the White House phone comment line — Fact-checked
as Mostly False
Fig. 4.1 shows users’ truth perceptions for these six stories, along with their fact-checked ground truth
levels, as determined by Snopes. The difference between the ground truth and perceived truth levels
highlights the need to account for differrent perception biases.
First, the majority of users correctly inferred the truthfulness of stories S1 and S2. Since story S1
is perceived to be false by most users, it may get reported by many and is thus likely to be prioritized by
the social media platforms to be fact checked. However, we assert that there is little to be gained by fact
checking stories whose truth value is already correctly judged by the crowds, just as there is little use in
fact checking claims by news satire outlets like The Daily Show3 and The Onion (theonion.com).
On the contrary, the figure shows that there exist biases in the truth perceptions of the users for
stories S3 and S4, with significant differences between the truth levels perceived by the users and
the stories’ actual ground truth levels. S3 reveals gullibility of the users, where people over-estimate
the truth level of the story (i.e., false positive bias). In contrast, S4 reveals users’ cynicality – people
under-estimate the truth level of the story (i.e., false negative bias). Interestingly, S4 is more likely to
be reported by users and fact checked with higher priority than S3. In fact, on today’s social media
platforms, the higher the false positive bias in the perceptions of a story, the less likely it is to be
reported and, consequently, become a subject for fact checking. Worse, current social media platforms
do not have mechanisms to reassure users about the credibility of a true story like S4 that is mistakenly
perceived by many users as false (i.e., high false negative bias), even after the story is fact checked.
Figs. 4.1(a-d) also highlight disagreements between users about the truthfulness of individual
stories. These disagreements are highly correlated with their political leaning. Fig. 4.1(e) and 4.1(f)
show that users with different political ideologies (e.g., Democrat and Republican-leaning users) indeed
perceive truth in news stories differently. People are more likely to trust stories that confirm their
political beliefs, while they are more likely to distrust stories that contradict their beliefs. Story S6,
which attacks Trump’s administration, is ‘Mostly False’ as determined by the expert fact checkers.
However, the majority of users who identify themselves as Democrats perceive this story to be accurate,
while most Republican users label it as false. On the other hand, the story S5, which raises questions
3http://www.cc.com/shows/the-daily-show-with-trevor-noah
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Figure 4.2: Overview of our proposed framework for social media platforms to prioritize stories for fact checking
by leveraging users’ truth perceptions. Social media platforms first gather users’ perceptions of truth
for the different news stories being shared on the platform using our Truth Perception Tests (RQ1).
Then the platforms pass the news stories along with the users’ truth perceptions to the prioritization
box (RQ2) and specify the prioritization objective. The prioritization box would then output a
ranked list of news stories that should be prioritized for fact checking based on the platform’s chosen
objective (RQ3).
against Clinton, is ‘False’ according to the expert fact-checkers, while the majority of Republican-
leaning users perceive it to be accurate, and Democrat users perceive it as false.
These examples highlight the pitfalls of ignoring biases in the crowds’ truth perceptions when
using them to prioritize stories for fact checking, and suggest the need for a clear definition of objectives
for the prioritization of stories, to ensure that the power of the crowd is being used appropriately to meet
these objectives. This research proposes a framework (shown in Fig. 4.2) for social media platforms
to prioritize stories for fact checking by more effectively leveraging users’ truth perceptions to satisfy
three important objectives:
O1: Removing false news stories from circulation
To restrict their circulation on social media platforms, any stories that are false need to be fact checked
with higher priority. Intuitively, this objective has been the primary focus of social media platforms.
Since the truth values of stories are not known beforehand, prior research efforts [Shu et al., 2017,
Kumar et al., 2016, Chen et al., 2015, Rony et al., 2017, Qazvinian et al., 2011, Kwon et al., 2013a, Oh
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et al., 2013, Maddock et al., 2015, Kwon et al., 2013b, Zhao et al., 2015, Kwon et al., 2017, Ma et al.,
2016, Ruchansky et al., 2017] have focused on automatically detecting potentially false stories. Such
potential false stories can then be prioritized for fact checking.
O2: Correcting the misperception of users
While must of the prior work has argued for the removal of false stories from social media platforms,
legal experts and free speech campaigners have compared it to censorship4. To address such concerns,
social media platforms may want to prioritize and fact check stories for which users’ perceived truth
levels are far from their ground truth levels, and flag these stories rather than removing them altogether.
O3: Decreasing disagreement among different users’ perceptions
For the society to have fruitful debates in the public sphere, it is essential to set a common ground for
different sections of the society. To ensure the existence of a common ground, it is essential to identify
topics that incur a significant degree of disagreement, and the platforms can then prioritize them for fact
checking to let people know the objective truth value of the stories. In our experiments, such stories
have a significant variance in truth perceptions reported by different users, especially when these users
have different ideological leanings.
Given this context, we answer the following three research questions in this paper:
• RQ1: How can we collect users’ perceptions of truth in news stories in a robust manner?
• RQ2: How do the three objectives for fact checking compare to one another? Can they be
satisfied simultaneously?
• RQ3: If a platform chooses an objective for prioritizing stories for fact checking, how can the
objective be implemented by leveraging users’ perceptions of truth in news stories?
4.2 Background
Over the recent years, the meaning of fake news has evolved and become compatible with disseminating
false information. For instances, Allcott and Gentzkow [2017] define it as "a news article that is
intentionally and verifiably false" and Golbeck et al. [2018] describe it as "information presented as a
news story that is factually incorrect and designed to deceive the consumer into believing it is true".
4https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/apr/24/global-crackdown-on-fake-news-raises-censorship-concerns
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There are several definitions or types of fake news such as fabricated content, misleading content,
imposter content, manipulated content, false connection, and false context [Wardle, 2017]. Sharma et al.
[2019] generalize the fake news definition as "A news article or message published and propagated
through media, carrying false information regardless the means and motives behind it" to capture the
different types of fake news. In this section, we review the detection of fake news from four viewpoints:
4.2.1 Content-based methods:
One way to assess the authenticity of news is to evaluate the content of news, such as text or images. In
this section, we briefly discuss fake news detection methods based on the content of the information.
Text and image features: Traditional machine learning frameworks (supervised, semi-supervised,
or unsupervised) use a set of manually selected features at various language levels such as lexicon,
syntax, semantic, and discourse-level to detect fake news [Feng et al., 2012, Pérez-Rosas et al., 2017,
Zhou et al., 2019, Chen and Guestrin, 2016]. Later, by embedding text and images as news content to
word-level [Mikolov et al., 2013] or pixel matrix, well-trained neural networks such as VGG-16/19
[Simonyan and Zisserman, 2014], Text-CNN [Kim, 2014], RNNs [Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997],
GRUs [Cho et al., 2014], and BRNNs [Schuster and Paliwal, 1997], and the Transformer [Devlin et al.,
2018, Vaswani et al., 2017] are used to extract latent textual and visual features of news content. Finally,
given news is classified as true or fake news. Fact-checking: Experts check the news produced by
traditional media to assess news authenticity. Social media platforms currently rely on human experts
and dedicated fact-checking outlets, such as Snopes (snopes.com), PolitiFact (politifact.com),
Full Fact (fullfact.org), and FactCheck (Fact Check.org) [Lyons, 2018]. These websites
provide content such as what is false and why is it false. They also provide invaluable insights for
identifying check-worthy content [Kumar et al., 2017] and explainable fake news detection [Shu et al.,
2019]. Stories deemed false by the fact checkers, who follow principled methods such as Poynter’s
Code of Principles 5, are then ranked lower in users’ news feeds or timelines, significantly limiting
their future views [Lyons, 2018]. Human supervision limits the number of claims of news that is
fact-checked. It is not possible to fact check every news story circulated on social media. Thus, platform
providers need to prioritize stories for fact-checking. The most pertinent question that emerges in this
5https://www.poynter.org/international-fact-checking-network-fact-checkers-code-principles
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context is how should the platform prioritize ‘check-worthy’ news stories? Currently, social media sites
encourage users to report any news stories reported as fake by numerous people are then prioritized for
fact-checking. In essence, to counter the proliferation of fake news, social media platforms are relying
on their users’ perceptions of the truthfulness of news to prioritize stories for fact-checking.
4.2.2 Propagation-based methods:
Malicious spreaders can easily manipulate the content-based methods that are being used for detecting
fake news. Thus, several studies focus on other methods; for example, [Jin et al., 2018, Zhou et al.,
2019] claim that fake news has different patterns compared to true news, such as having high informality
and diversity as well as being more emotional. Vosoughi et al. [2018] have observed that fake news
spreads through social media with different patterns compared to true news. Several cascade features
such as cascade size, cascade breadth, cascade depth, structural virality (Average distance among all
pairs of nodes in a cascade), node degree, spread speed, and cascade similarity are used to classify the
news as fake or true [Castelo et al., 2019, Vosoughi et al., 2018, Wu et al., 2015]. Bian et al. [2020] and
Ma et al. [2018] develop recursive neural networks based on news cascades to classify the news.
4.2.3 Source-based methods:
Untill now, we focused on the authenticity of the news; however, one can detect fake news by focusing
on the credibility of its source. By source of news, we mean the sources that create and publish the
news as well as the sources that spread the news stories [Shu et al., 2020, Zhang et al., 2018, Zhou
and Zafarani, 2019]. We just need to assess a few outlets’ credibilities for traditional mass media or
popular news publishers in social media. Sitaula et al. [2020] construct the collaboration network of
news authors in which they show that the networks are homogeneous. Network homogeneity means
that fake-news authors are more densely connected. True news authors are also strongly connected,
while there is a weak connection across the groups. There are also many resources that show the ground
truth on the credibility of news sources such as Meida/Fact Check 6 or NewsGuard 7, which provide the
list of news sources with their credibility based on a different point of view such as political leaning.




intentionally spread the fake-news same as bots) or vulnerable normal users (spread the fake-news
unintentionally without recognizing the falsehood). Several works detect malicious or bots using groups
of features such as network, user, friend, temporal, content, sentiment [Cai et al., 2017, Morstatter et al.,
2016, Shao et al., 2018].
The above studies discuss various methods to identify false news stories on the Web. Once detected,
false stories may be treated in several different manners, which are non-orthogonal:
• Strategy 1: Remove false news stories from circulation. Upon detection, a hard-line policy is
to remove them entirely to block their spread on social platforms. Alternative soft-line policies
would be to down-rank contents or label them as “false.” Previous research has shown that
contents labeled as a rumor will less likely to spread further, indicating efficacy of labeling
[Friggeri et al., 2014] Various independent fact-checking agencies such as snopes.com and
politifact.com act as distributed data sources for news platforms.
• Strategy 2: Correct the misperception of the users. Beyond reducing the circulation of false
news stories, a more active mitigation strategy is to “correct” for its impact on social networks.
While there exists a number of reputable fact-checking sources and studies, no study has examined
how false or true news stories may be differently perceived by people irrespective of their ground
truth. For example, false urban legends may spread even when people are aware of their veracity,
simply because they are amusing. Perception towards political news stories may vary depending
on one’s underlying political belief. In correcting the misperception of users, one needs to
decide which stories to prioritize (i.e., the current study) and also design an effective methods for
correction, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
• Strategy 3: Decrease the disagreement between the users’ perceptions of truth. In light of
building a healthy public sphere that allows diverse ideologies, it is necessary to set a common
ground on the intent and knowledge of news stories. Common ground can be achieved by helping
to decrease the disagreement amongst users’ truth perceptions on news stories. For this, one
needs to identify news stories of upmost disagreement to prioritize (i..e, the current study) and
design an effective methods for mitigation (i.e., out of scope of this paper). This paper will
discuss an effective method to identify news articles of upmost disagreement.
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Figure 4.3: An example of the survey question that we used for performing Truth Perception Tests for the news
claims in our dataset.
The remainder of this paper will introduce data and methodology, expand on the needs for these
mitigation strategies, and suggest specific algorithms for each strategy.
RQ1: Designing truth perception tests
To address our first research question, we designed Truth Perception Tests (TPTs) that can be used to
assess how users implicitly perceive truth in news stories — i.e.,Perceived Truth Level (PTL). Using
this methodology, we solicit users’ truth perceptions for a set of 150 stories that have already been
verified by expert fact-checkers at Snopes.com, and thus have a known Ground Truth Level (GTL) to
which we can compare users’ truth perceptions.
We perform TPTs as online surveys. While we did not limit our respondents to a specific time
frame, we strongly encouraged them to respond rapidly by giving them the following instructions at
the start of the test: “Please do not conduct any web search or use any online/offline resources for
verifying or validating the claim presented to you. Please use your best judgment (your instinctive gut
based guess within a few seconds) to label the claims.” On average, our respondents gave their truth
perception responses for each claim within 10 seconds.
To gather truth perceptions, we showed respondents a news claim and asked them to label the
claim as either ‘True’, ‘Mostly True’, ‘Mixture’, ‘Mostly False’ and ‘False’, as shown in the example





Fig. 3. Mapping ground truth labels of news stories on a scale between -1.0 and + 1.0.
The number of news stories collected corresponding to different ground truth labels
for our three datasets are also indicated in the figure.
2. PolitiFact dataset: The second dataset was collected from the fact
checking website PolitiFact, which categorizes news stories into
six ground truth labels – Pants on fire, False, Mostly False, Half
True, Mostly True, and True.‡‡‡ We mapped these ground truth
labels on a scale between -1.0 and +1.0, as shown in Figure 3.
Again, we collected the 30 most recently fact checked news
stories from each ground truth label, getting a total of 180 claims.
In this dataset, each claim is associated with a source (person
or organization) which made the claim, and this source is also
shown to the users while performing Truth Perception Tests.
3. Rumors dataset: The third dataset consists of 30 rumor and 30
non-rumor claims from a prior study (3), with a total of 60 claims.
Here the rumors have been mapped to a score of -1.0 and the
non-rumors to +1.0, as shown in Figure 3.
Across the three datasets we collected a total of 390 news stories
for performing our Truth Perception Tests.
Gathering Users’ Implicit Truth Perceptions. By conducting the
Truth Perception Tests as AMT surveys, we gathered the truth percep-
tions of 100 AMT master workers (4) from the US for each news story
in our dataset. We observed that the average time the AMT workers
took to rate their perceived truth levels of a story are 11, 12 and 9.2
seconds for Snopes, PolitiFact and Rumors datasets respectively. This
observation confirms that users gave rapid responses for our tests for
measuring their implicit truth perceptions, which is a hallmark of
implicit tests.
We varied two factos for collecting the truth perceptions: (i) Which
users are best for performing the truth perception tests? (Master AMT
workers, ordinary AMT workers, or representative sample of US
population using SSI) (ii) Do monetary incentives lower (/change) the
perception biases of users?
@Reza - Please add the consolidated figures and tables we dis-
cussed for the above questions.
Limitations:. At the end of our AMT survey, we also asked the workers
for their demographic information including their political leanings.
Out of the workers who took our tests, 53.7% were democrats, 20.4%
republicans, 21.6% neutral and 4.2% did not disclose their leaning.
A limitation of our dataset is that the demographic distributions of
workers may not be representative of the offline population. However,
we can still draw many important observations from this data. Also,
since we rely on the workers to tell us their political leaning, our data
may suffer from self-reportage problem. In the future, we plan to re-
peat the experiments with demographically representative set of users
‡‡‡http://www.politifact.com/
using the participant pool of a US survey company to overcome these
limitations and to also study the impact of users’ other demographic
characteristics on their perceptions of truth in news.
Measures of Perception Bias
By perception bias (PB) of a user U for a news story S, we refer to
the error or deviation between the ground truth level (GTL) of the
story S and the user U’s perceived truth level (PT LU ) of the story S.
Therefore, for each story we have two associated truth levels:
• Ground Truth-Level (GTL): It is given by the ground truth labels
for news stories in each dataset and takes a value between -1.0
and + 1.0. The closer the GTL is to -1.0, the more false the story
has been labeled and the closer it to +1.0, the more true the story
has been labeled by the fact checking websites.
• Perceived Truth-Level (PTL): It is the aggregated value of indi-









where N is the total number of users whose truth perceptions for
the story S are being aggregated. The closer the value of PTL(S)
is to -1.0, the more the users perceive story S to be false and the
closer it is to +1.0 the more the users perceive it to be true.
Based on these truth levels of each story, we compute the following
measures to aggregate the individual perception biases of a set of users
for each news story:
• Mean Perception Bias (MPB) of a story measures the error in
the collective perceptions of users (i.e., wisdom of the crowds)
in assessing the truth level of a story. Therefore, the Mean Per-
ception Bias for a story S is given by:
MPB(S) = PT L(S) GT L(S) [2]
• False Positive Bias (FPB) of a story S measures the gullibility
of users in their perception of the truth level of the story, i.e.,
how much the users have over-estimated the truth level of the
story by rating it to be more true than it is according to ground









N ,when PT Lu(S) > GTL(S)
0,otherwise
[3]
Here Ngullible is the number of gullible users, i.e., users whose
perceived truth level (PT Lu(S)) is greater (more true) than the
ground truth level (GTL(S)) of the story.
• False Negative Bias (FNB) of a story S measures the cynicality
of users in their perception of the truth level of the story, i.e.,
how much the users have under-estimated the truth level of the
story by rating it to be less true than it is according to the ground
truth. False Negative Bias of a story S is computed as follows:
Lead author last name et al. PNAS | June 22, 2018 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 3
Figure 4.4: Mapping truth labels of news stories on a scale between -1.0 and + 1.0. The number of stories
collected for each ground truth label are also indicated.
and +1.0. By aggregating the answers given by each user u for a news story S, PTLu(S), we compute







where N is the total umber of users whose truth perceptions for the story S are being aggregated.
The news claims utilized in the TPTs were drawn from news stories that had been professionally
fact-checked by Snopes and thus we know their ground truth level. Snopes uses the same set of labels
that we used as our answer choices to categorize news stories: ‘False’, ‘Mostly False’, ‘Mixture’,
‘Mostly True’, and ‘True’. Again, we mapped these trut ategories on a scale between -1.0 and +1.0,
as shown in Fig. 4.4. In January 2018, from the claims labeled under the Politics topic category by
Snopes, we selected 30 recently fact checked news stories for each truth category to get a total of 150
stories. The ground truth level for each story S, GTL(S), is given by the value of the truth category
assigned by Sn pes for that story.
Test design validation
To ensure that our TPTs are maximally robust to variations in deployment and a broad set of potential
survey biases, we conducted multiple micro-experiments. In these micro-experiments we evaluated
how, if at all, different test designs may influence our results. We evaluated three types of effects:
• Sample Effects: Survey methodology literature [Peer et al., 2014] reports that less-naive respon-
dents (e.g., experts) may answer certain survey questions differently than naive respondents.
Additionally, demographic composition of the survey sample is known to affect the generaliz-
ability of results[AAPOR, 2010]. Therefore, to account for such sample effects, we compared
the results of our tests: (i) when run using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) Masters [AMT,
The Mechanical Turk Blog 2011] vs. naive MTurk workers, both from the US; and, (ii) when
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run using MTurk Masters from the US vs. a census-representative sample of US participants
recruited by Survey Sampling International (surveysampling.com).
The survey variations we compare in the context of sample effects are:
– Running our test using MTurk Masters vs. naive MTurkers.
– Running our test using census-representative sample of participants recruited by Survey
Sampling International(SSI participants) vs. MTurk Masters(experts participants).
Surveys Chi square Chi square Correlation
dependency dependency of TPB
of Dist-ANS of Acc
MTurk Masters Chi-value:0.0 Chi-value:0.0 0.9
& MTurk naive p-value=1.0 p-value=1.0
MTurk naive Chi-value:0.0 Chi-value:0.0 0.89
& SSI workers p-value=1.0 p-value=1.0
Table 4.1: Sample effects: We evaluate the similarity between the distribution of answers to each survey using a
X2 test of independence.
Table 4.1 depicts that both distribution of answering and accuracy of judgments are independent
(fail to reject H0) of types of survey respondents. Last column also shows that there is a
significantly high correlation between TPB of claims of different surveys with different workers
samples. This means that a particular claim has a close value of TPB in different surveys which
confirm that our measure is robust against the sample effects.
Where, Total Perception Bias (TPB) of a story S captures the total error (gullibility or cynicality)







where N is the total number of users whose truth perceptions of the story S are being aggregated.
• Answer Choice Effects: It has been reported previously [Redmiles et al., 2017] that Likert scale
length (e.g., even or odd numbers of answer choices, where scales with an odd number of answer
choices include a “middle” neutral option), may effect the strength of participants’ responses. We
compared the effects of using a 6 and 7 point Likert item scale. Additionally, the text labels of
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the Likert answer choices may also affect respondents’ answers to survey questions8. To examine
this effect, we compared the effect of using the Snopes’ labels (see Fig. 4.3) with an alternate 7
point scale ("I can confirm it to be true", “Very likely to be true”, “Possibly true”, “Can’t tell”,
“Possibly false”, “Very likely to be false”, and “I can confirm it to be false”) and 6 point scale
(which excluded the “Can’t tell” option from the 7 point scale). We evaluated the answer choice
effects by comparing 6, 7 point scale with Snopes’ 5 point scale. Table 4.2 depicts that both
distribution of answering and accuracy of judgments are independent (fail to reject H0) of the
types of answer choices in the surveys. Significant high correlation between TPB of claims of
different surveys with different answer choices is shown in last column.
Surveys Chi square Chi square Correlation
dependency dependency of TPB
of Dist-ANS of Acc
7-pt scale Chi-value:0.0 Chi-value:0.0 0.94
& 6-pt scale p-value=1.0 p-value=1.0
7-pt scale Chi-value:0.0 Chi-value:0.0 0.98
& 5-pt scale p-value=1.0 p-value=1.0
Table 4.2: Answer choice effects
• Satisficing and Incentive Effects: Satisficing [Krosnick et al., 1996] is a commonly observed
survey response effect in which respondents select what they consider to be the minimum
acceptable answer, without fully considering their true feelings. Surveys such as our TPTs may
be at particular risk of satisficing because they encourage quick responses. Thus, we explored the
effect of incentivizing participants to provide correct answers to evaluate whether satisficing may
be affecting our test results.
To investigate the impact of satisficing and incentives, we designed a survey in which we gave
respondents incentives for answering correctly. At the beginning of the survey, we told the participants:
"In addition to the amount promised for the task, for each of your judgements which CORRECTLY
matches the actual truth status of the claims, we will pay you 5 cents as a bonus. For example, if you
judge a claim to be ‘True’, or ‘Mostly True’, and the claim is actually true, then you’ll get 5 cents for
8Prior work shows that it is always best practice to have text labels on Likert item points [Krosnick and Fabrigar, 1997],
thus we do not examine the omission of text labels.
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Surveys Chi square Chi square Correlation
dependency dependency of TPB
of Dist-ANS of Acc
5-pt scale & incentive Chi-value:0.0 Chi-value:0.0 0.85
and 5-pt scale p-value=1.0 p-value=1.0
7-pt scale & incentive Chi-value:0.0 Chi-value:0.0 0.92
and 7-pt scale p-value=1.0 p-value=1.0
Table 4.3: Satisficing and Incentive effects
the claim. Similarly, to get the bonus for an actual false claim, it should be judged by you as ‘False’
or ‘Mostly False’. Finally if you judged the claim as ‘Mixture’ and the claim actually is mixture or
mostly true/mostly false you will earn bonus." To ensure that participants do not use online or offline
resources to estimate the truthfulness of the claims we showed a timer in each page and told them: "If
your judgment for each question takes more than 15 seconds then there would not be any bonus, even if
you answer the question correctly."
To see if incentivizing has any effect or not we compare the incentivized survey with the unincen-
tivized survey. Table 4.3 depicts that incentivizing has no effect.
In brief, we found no statistically significant differences across the survey variations for the
proportion of correct answers. Additionally, we observed statistically significant high-correlation
between our proposed measure of TPB, computed for our survey variations, with the Pearson correlation
coefficients ranging from 0.90 to 0.96. Figures 4.5 depicts that that wisdom of crowds (accuracy of
judging by users) is very similar across different survey variations.























Figure 4.5: Accuracy of judgments(wisdom of crowds) for different design surveys.
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Figures 4.6 summarizes the results of comparing TPB test variations, which show very similar
results across variants. We thus conclude that our test is relatively robust and consequently useful for
application in industry settings and future research on content misperceptions.






















Figure 4.6: PDF of Total Perception Bias(TPB) for different design surveys.
Data collection
We ran our validated truth perception tests on MTurk during May-June 2018 collecting a total of 15,000
responses. Each MTurk worker saw 50 claims and no worker could take the survey more than once.
Any Mturk worker over the age of 18 who resided in the US was eligible to participate in our survey.
Limitations
While we validate our truth perception tests extensively to ensure they are robust against design varia-
tions, our method does have some limitations which we discuss here. When users encounter and flag
false news stories on the social media platforms, they are not only exposed to the claim or headline,
but also to the source of the article, the images from the article, summary snippet or text of the article,
and additional context for instance likes or shares for the story etc. Our controlled experiments do
capture the effect of the claim (or headline) of the news stories on the users, but they do not capture the
effects of other factors as yet, and a promising direction of future work would be to design controlled
experiments to measure the impact of the other factors.
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Figure 4.7: Sample stories from Fig. 4.1. Perceived Truth Level is determined by averaging truth perceptions of
100 AMT workers. Ground Truth Level is determined by Snopes.
RQ2: Comparing the prioritization objectives
As discussed earlier, social media sites today prioritize stories based on the number of reports they
receive from users flagging a piece of content as false. This approach assumes that false stories will
receive more reports from users than true stories and hence will be fact checked with higher priority
than true stories. Fig. 4.7 depicts the perceived truth levels of the six stories mentioned in Introduction,
versus their ground truth levels as determined by Snopes.
Under the current strategy, the priority order would be S1, S4, S5, S6, S3, and then S2, while the
desired ranking to satisfy objective O1 (removing false news stories by ranking according to GTL)
would be S1, S5, S6, S3, S4, and then S2. Thus the current strategy does not satisfy this objective
satisfactorily.
As described earlier, based on our analysis of users’ truth perceptions, we identified two additional
objectives for fact checking stories: O2 (correcting users’ misperceptions) and O3 (decreasing disagree-
ment among users). Thus, we also seek to evaluate: Does the current strategy satisfy O2 or O3? Are
these three objectives (O1, O2 and O3) compatible and can one strategy address them simultaneously?
In this section, we compare objectives O1, O2, and O3 to see if they are addressed by the current
reporting-based strategy and to evaluate whether these three objectives can be satisfied simultaneously.
For performing these comparisons, we need to first prioritize the six stories according to every objective.
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O1 and O2 O1 and O3 O2 and O3
Spearman’s ρ 0.31 -0.05 -0.01
Table 4.4: Correlation between rankings to satisfy different objectives.
Now we compare objectives O1, O2, and O3. For objective O2, we use the metric of Total
Perception Bias (TPB) to rank the stories. Intuitively, TPB captures the aggregate deviation of perceived
truth level (aggregated over N users) from ground truth level of a story S that we discussed it earlear.
For ranking according to O3, we can either rank news stories using Disputability (i.e., the variance
in the individual truth perceptions of users) or according to Ideological Mean Perception Bias (IMPB)
which captures the difference in truth perceptions of different ideological groups (Democrats and
Republican in this case), given by
IMPB(S) =|MPBDem(S)−MPBRep(S)| (4.3)
where, MPB(S) = PTL(S) - GTL(S), measures the error in the collective perceptions of users in
assessing the truth level of a story.
When we rank the example stories based on the three objectives using these metrics, we get
different priority orders:
Priority order to satisfy O1: S1,S5,S6,S3,S4,S2
Priority order to satisfy O2: S4,S5,S3,S6,S2,S1
Priority order to satisfy O3 (Disputability): S3,S5,S6,S2,S1,S4
Priority order to satisfy O3 (IMPB): S5,S6,S1,S4,S3,S2
Moreover, when we consider the full dataset of all 150 news stories and rank them according
to each objective, we observe little correlation between the rankings achieved when satisfying these
different objectives. While we can observe some association of ranks between O1 and O2, there is
almost no association (ρ close to 0) between the other pairs of objectives. Table 4.4 presents the
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient ρ (ranging between +1.0 and -1.0) between stories ranked by
different objectives. Thus, we can conclude that these three objectives are incompatible, and can not be
satisfied simultaneously.
Thus, platform providers must chose one objective over the others to prioritize stories. Each choice
of objective will necessitate that an entirely different set of potentially “fake” news stories willl remain
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Figure 4.8: The top 5 ranked news stories prioritized according to the three objectives of social media platforms
for selecting stories for fact checking. The low overlap between the three ranked lists highlights the
complementary nature of the objectives.
unverified. To illustrate this effect, Fig. 4.8 displays the top five news stories, ranked by each objective.
Thus, special care needs to be taken by the platforms to finalize the design of their fact checking
exercise.
RQ3: Operationalizing objectives using truth perceptions
Having identified and compared three potential objectives that a social media platform could have
for prioritizing stories for fact-checking, we now focus on how the platform can operationalize these
objectives by leveraging users’ perceptions of truth in news stories.
O3: Decreasing disagreement among different users’ truth perceptions
We start by describing the easiest objective to operationalize (O3). The goal is to prioritize stories
that have the highest disagreement in user truth perceptions. We quantify the disagreement in users’
perceptions as the disputability of news stories, i.e., the variance in the individual truth perceptions
of users. The platform can collect users’ truth perceptions and rank the stories according to their
disputability to satisfy O3.
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If the ideological leanings of the users assessing the stories are known then the stories which have
a maximum disagreement in the perceptions of users with different ideologies can be prioritized. We
capture such differences in assessment as the Ideological Mean Perception Bias (IMPB) of a story, as
defined earlier. Most social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, have detailed information
about their users via users’ explicit inputs or behavior on these platforms, including information on
their potential ideological leaning. Therefore, platforms could compute the IMPB of a story to assist in
fact checking prioritization.
Further, even in the absence of such information about the ideological leanings of users, it is
possible to achieve O3. We found that the disputability of stories is moderately correlated (Pearson
Correlation: 0.38) with IMPB. Thus, prioritizing stories by disputability also prioritizes stories with
higher variation in perception between users with different ideological leanings.
O2: Correcting the misperception of users
To correct users’ misperceptions, we need to quantify the extent to which users incorrectly perceive the
truth of a story. To do so, we use the previously defined Total Perception Bias (TPB) metric to measure
the aggregated error (gullibility or cynicality) in users’ perceptions of a story S. Ranking stories by
TPB prioritizes misperceived stories: stories where users’ perceived truth levels (PTL) differ widely
from the ground truth level (GTL) of the story. However, to compute TPB, we must know GTL, which
is not available in practice. Here, we propose an alternative approach: training a supervised learning
classifier that classifies a story as having either high or low TPB. To design such a classifier, we need
the GTL of a small set of stories that have been labeled as high or low TPB for generating the training
data. Then, TPB can be predicted for a larger set of stories for which GTLs may not be known.
As an illustration, we construct a classifier to predict the TPB values for the 150 stories we studied
in this work. We label a news story to have ‘High TPB’ if it has a TPB value above the median TPB
value, or ‘Low TPB’ if it has a value lower than the median. We split our dataset of 120 claims, and
consider 80% of the data (96 claims) as the training dataset and the remaining 20% (24 claims) as the
test dataset. Using this ground truth dataset, we train four types of classifiers (Linear SVM, Naive
Bayes, Logistic Regression, and Random Forest). Our feature set includes the mean, median, variance,
and skew of perceptions of users with different demographic features such as ‘Political Ideology’, ‘Age’,





Political ideology Conservative, Moderate, Liberal
Age 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74
Gender Female, Male
Education degree
College graduate bs/ba or other 4year degree, Postgraduate training
or professional schooling after college toward a masters degree or
PhD law or medical school, Post-graduate training or professional schooling,
Some college associate degree no 4 year degree,
High school graduate grade 12 or certificate,
Technical trade or vocational school after high school’
Employment
In full-time work permanent, In full-time work temp contract,
Retired, Unemployed, In part-time work permanent, In part timework temp
contract, Student only, Part-time work part-time student, Self-employed
Income
Under 10000, 10000-20000, 30001-40000, 40001-50000, 50001-60000,
60001-70000, 70001-100000, 100001-150000, 150001 or more
Marital status Married, Living with partner, Divorced, Widowed, Separated, Single
Table 4.5: Demographic attributes collected from the Amazon Mechanical Turk workers who took our Truth
Perception Tests.
ranking with recursive feature elimination, we observed that the best set of features includes ‘Political
Ideology’, and ‘Income’.
For training our classifiers, we use 5-fold cross-validation. In each test, the original sample is
partitioned into 5 sub-samples, out of which 4 are used as training data, and the remaining one is
used for testing the classifier. The process is then repeated 5 times, with each of the 5 sub-samples
used exactly once as the test data, thus producing 5 results. The entire 5-fold cross-validation was
then repeated 20 times with different seeds used to shuffle the original dataset, thus producing 100
different results. The results reported are average accuracies across these 100 runs, along with the 90%
confidence interval.
We observe an average prediction accuracy of 82% (using Linear SVM & Random Forest classi-
fiers), with 90% confidence interval of 0.09%, illustrating the potential for satisfying O2 given a small
ground truth dataset. In second row of Table 4.6, we depict the performance as the average accuracy
across the 100 runs along with the 90% confidence interval of the four types of supervised classifiers
for our prediction task, using the best set of features (including ’Political ideology’ and ’Income’)
determined by feature ranking with recursive feature elimination. As shown in the table, we achieve
maximum accuracy of 82%.
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Table 4.6: Prediction results using different types of supervised methods for the two tasks of predicting GTL and
TPB. Performance of each classifier is reported as the average accuracy across the 100 runs along
with the 90% confidence intervals.
Linear SVM Naive Bayes Logistic Regression Random Forest
Predicting GTL 0.7 ± 0.007 0.67 ± 0.008 0.68 ± 0.010 0.7 ± 0.009
Predicting TPB 0.82 ± 0.009 0.78 ± 0.008 0.79 ± 0.008 0.82 ± 0.010
Note that our prediction algorithm for TPB of news stories is based only on users’ truth perceptions
and their basic demographic attributes. We believe, predictive performance could be further improved
by including more detailed demographic and behavioral features, typically available to social media
platforms.
O1: Removing false news from circulation
Finally, to operationalize O1, social media platforms need to prioritize false stories for fact-checking.
We examined two methods that leverage the users’ truth perceptions (PTL) to estimate the ground truth
levels of news stories. For both the methods, we need a labeled ground truth dataset, so we label all
the stories annotated to be ‘True’ or ‘Mostly True’ by Snopes to be ‘True’, while labeling all stories
annotated to be ‘False’ or ‘Mostly False’ by Snopes as ‘False’. Ignoring the stories labeled ‘Mixture’,
we were left with a labeled dataset of 60 ‘True’ stories and 60 ‘False’ stories.
We first took a “wisdom of crowds” approach and estimated the GTL using the average PTL value
for the 100 workers who assessed the story. We considered stories with a positive average PTL to be
‘True’, while negative ones to be ‘False’. We observed that we correctly assess the truth labels for 67%
of stories in our ground truth labeled dataset. Additionally, when we rank stories by PTL and GTL,
respectively, we observe a moderate ranking correlation of 0.4.
Alternatively, similar to O2, we trained supervised classifiers to predict the truth value (‘True’
or ‘False’) of a story. Using the same set of classifiers, feature set and experimental setup as O2, we
achieve an average accuracy of 70% (using Linear SVM & Random Forest classifiers) across the 100
runs, with a 90% confidence interval of 0.7%. In first row of Table 4.6, we depict the performance as
the average accuracy across the 100 runs along with the 90% confidence interval of the four types of
supervised classifiers for our prediction task.
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Operationalizing O1 proved to be very challenging, as also demonstrated by the amount of prior
research on identifying “fake” news stories in recent times [Shu et al., 2017, Chopra et al., 2017, Zhao
et al., 2015, Bourgonje et al., 2017, Chakraborty et al., 2016b, Bhatt et al., 2017, Kumar et al., 2016,
Qazvinian et al., 2011, Ruchansky et al., 2017, Kwon et al., 2017, Kim et al., 2017, Oh et al., 2013,
Ciampaglia et al., 2015, Kumar et al., 2017, Ruchansky et al., 2017]. While we only achieve limited
success in operationalizing O1, further improvements could be potentially made in the future, if we
can gather more information such as the network structure [Kumar et al., 2016, Qazvinian et al., 2011,
Kim et al., 2017, Ciampaglia et al., 2015] or engagement of users while sharing the news [Kumar et al.,
2016, Ruchansky et al., 2017, Kwon et al., 2017, Kim et al., 2017].
Summary
In summary, we make three primary contributions in this paper.
1. Methodological: We developed a new method for assessing users’ truth perceptions (N=15,000) of
content (e.g., news stories). Our test asks users to rapidly assess (i.e., at the rate of a few seconds per
story) how truthful or untruthful the claims in a news story are. We conducted our truth perception
tests on-line and gathered truth perceptions of 100 Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers from the
USA [AMT, The Mechanical Turk Blog 2011] for each story.
2. Empirical: Our exploratory analysis of users’ truth perceptions yielded several interesting findings.
For instance, (i) for many stories, the collective wisdom of the crowd (average truth rating) differs
significantly from the actual truth of the story, i.e., wisdom of crowds is inaccurate, (ii) across different
stories, we find evidence for both false positive perception bias (i.e., a gullible user perceiving the story
to be more true than it is in reality) and false negative perception bias (i.e., a cynical user perceiving
a story to be more false than it is in reality), and (iii) users’ political ideologies influence their truth
perceptions for the most controversial stories (those stories with high variance in truth perception
between users), it is frequently the result of users’ political ideologies (i.e., whether they support
democrats vs. republicans) influencing their truth perceptions.
3. Practical: Our predictive analysis of users’ perception biases reveals the limitations of current
strategies for selecting a small set of news stories to fact check based on how many users report the
story as fake. We provide a proof of concept simulation for how our truth perception test and classifier
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can be used to achieve the three goals stated above for prioritizing stories for fact checking. However,
please note that design of mechanisms to signal the fact checked label to the users such that they are




A growing number of people rely on social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, for
their news and information needs [Lichterman, 2010, Teevan et al., 2011], where users themselves
play a role in selecting the sources from which they consume information, overthrowing traditional
journalistic gatekeeping [Shoemaker et al., 2009]. Since users can just select their information sources,
they don’t have full control over the content they receive. Moreover, it is very hard to ascertain the
quality, relevance, and credibility of information produced by social media users [Agichtein et al., 2008,
Castillo et al., 2011, Farajtabar et al., 2015]. To tackle these concerns, in this thesis, we first address the
question of how efficient users are at selecting their information sources.
We have defined three intuitive notions of user’s efficiency in social media – link, in-flow and delay
efficiency – to assess how good users are at selecting who to follow within the social media system to
acquire information. Our framework is general and applicable to any social media system where every
user follows others within the system to receive the information they produce. We have then leveraged
our notions of efficiency to help us in understanding the relationship between different factors, such as
the popularity of received information and the users’ ego-networks structure.
Here, we have focused on three definitions of efficiency (link, in-flow, and delay). However, we
could leverage this idea to define more complex notions of efficiency. For example, we could define
efficiency in terms of diversity, i.e., it would be interesting to find the set of users that, if followed,
would cover the same unique memes while maximizing the diversity of topics or perspectives that
are delivered with the memes, and then compare this set with the original set of followees in terms
of diversity. This would provide a framework to mitigate the effects of the filtering bubble and echo
chamber present in current social media systems. Moreover, some of the memes could be treated
preferentially over other memes. This could be achieved by means of covering a list of non-unique
memes favoring repetitions of a preferential subset of memes, e.g., memes matching the user’s interests
should be delivered to the user more often. Remarkably, these more complex notions of efficiency can
often be expressed as integer linear programs, similarly to the minimal set cover problem, which can be
solved using relaxation methods with provable guarantees [Vazirani, 2001].
Additionally, we have introduced a heuristic method that improves both in-flow and delay efficiency
of users, while still delivering them the same unique memes. Similar heuristics can be naturally designed
to optimize efficiency with respect to multiple quantities (be it link, in-flow, delay, or diversity). In this
context, it would be very interesting to design methods with provable guarantees to find sets of users
that are optimal with respect to multiple quantities.
Our work also opens other interesting venues for future work. For example, we have defined
and computed a measure of efficiency for each user independently. However, one could also think
on global notions of efficiency for the Twitter information network as a whole, perhaps using a multi
set cover approach. We have evaluated user’s efficiency at acquiring four different types of memes.
However, a systematic comparison of user’s efficiency at acquiring many types of memes appears as a
interesting research direction. Since we have applied our framework to study information efficiency
only on Twitter, it would be interesting to study information efficiency of other microblogging services
(Weibo, Pinterest, Tumblr) and social networking sites (Facebook, Google+). Finally, it would be worth
to investigate how users’ efficiency relates to their levels of activity and engagement within the online
social media system.
Having characterized how efficient users are at selecting information sources, we then focus on
how can we break the filter bubbles that users get trapped in. To minimize the possibility of social media
users getting trapped in ‘echo chambers’ or ‘filter bubbles’, prior works have proposed to introduce
diversity in the news that users are consuming [Munson et al., 2013a, Park et al., 2009b, Keegan, 2017].
Often, such approaches which highlight the most belief challenging news, increase the chances of users
rejecting them, thereby defeating the original purpose [Munson and Resnick, 2010, Lord and Ross,
1979, Miller et al., 1993, Munro and Ditto, 1997]. In this thesis, we propose a complementary approach
to inject diversity in users’ news consumption by highlighting news posts which evoke similar reactions
from different readers, irrespective of their own political leanings.
Towards that end, to our knowledge, we made the first attempt to define and operationalize
consensus of news posts on social media. Subsequently, we compared several properties of high
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and low consensus news posts and found them to be equally popular, and covering similar topics.
Additionally, we observed that high consensus posts lead to higher cross-cutting exposure for the users.
Next, utilizing our proposed novel class of audience leaning based features, we developed a method to
automatically infer the consensus of news posts on Twitter. Using our proposed consensus inference
method, we publicly deployed "Purple Feed" – a system which highlights high consensus posts from
different news outlets on Twitter. With "Purple Feed", the users can view the high consensus tweets
posted by both Republican-leaning and Democrat-leaning media outlets during the last one week.1
Users can also view both high and low consensus posts posted by individual publishers.2
We then studied the diffusion of news in Twitter. We investigated how users with various political
leanings (liberals, conservatives and neutrals) get exposed to low and high consensus news posted by
different publishers (e.g. CNN, FoxNews, etc.). We found that (1) while low consensus news stories are
more likely to proliferate amongst the users with a particular political leaning, high consensus news has
a much higher chance of spreading among users with different political leanings; (2) high consensus
news posted by neutral publishers has the lowest disparity for spreading among liberal and conservative
users; and (3) as users get farther away from the publishers, they get a more biased exposure to the
news. Based on the above observations, we studied the effect of spreading high consensus news through
neutral users on decreasing the disparity in users’ exposure. Our extensive simulation experiments
on Twitter showed that our proposed strategy can be highly effective in decreasing the disparity of
information across users with differing views. Our findings may be helpful for breaking filter bubbles
and reducing fragmentation in online social media.
In future, we plan to conduct a large scale characterization study of news posts and publishers on
social media, and evaluate the impact of showing high consensus news posts on the users. We believe
that our work on identifying high consensus news posts could be integrated with different information
retrieval mechanisms on social media, and could be useful for designing mechanisms for mitigating
filter bubble and echo chambers, for reducing fragmentation in news consumption, and for encouraging
healthy debate on diverse issues on social media platforms.
1Available at http://twitter-app.mpi-sws.org/purple-feed/.
2For instance, high and low consensus tweets posted by New York Times can be viewed at: http://twitter-app.mpi-
sws.org/purple-feed/app-tweet-1.php?query=NYTimes.
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Finally we address the concern regarding how do the users perceive the truthfulness of information?
We deeply examined how users perceive truth in news stories by developing novel and robust truth
perception tests, where users are asked to rapidly assess how true or false the claims in a news story
are. We validated our tests against deployment variations and common survey biases such as sample
effects, answer choice effects, and satisficing and incentive effects. For our dataset of 150 news claims
collected from Snopes.com, we performed our truth perception tests online on the AMT platform to
collect users’ perceptions of truth in news stories (N=15,000). Leveraging users’ truth perceptions, we
propose a novel framework for prioritizing stories for fact checking, with three potential, competing
objectives: (i) removing false news stories from circulation, (ii) correcting the misperception of the
users, and (iii) decreasing the disagreement between different users’ perceptions of truth. Using a
combination of user perceptions elicited using our truth perception tests, users’ demographic features,
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